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ARTICLES 
THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION'S PROTECTION 
OF FREE EXPRESSION 
Seth F. Kreimd 
INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of expression is the paradigmatic right of the informa-
tion age. As opportunities for communication grow exponentially, 
and a larger and larger proportion of commercial activity consists of 
the transfer of knowledge and information, constitutional guarantees 
of freedom of speech and freedom of the press cast an ever-
expanding shadow. During the last decade, hardly a term has passed 
in the United States Supreme Court which has not seen the vindica-
tion of federal constitutional protection of free expression against 
two or three federal statutes and a half dozen state and local con-
straints. The United States Supreme Court's activism on behalf of 
free expression is rivaled only by its exertions on behalf of states' 
. h l ng ts. 
As Justice Brennan reminded us a quarter century ago,2 and oth-
ers have regularly reiterated, however, the work of the United States 
Supreme Court does not comprise the entire fabric of American con-
stitutional freedom. Each of the fifty states has both historical and 
legal warrant to provide protections independent of federal norms. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has for over a decade self-
consciously grasped that opportunity to elaborate an independent 
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The research and drafting of 
this article was facilitated tremendously by the outstanding research assistance of Leonardo 
Cuello and Andrew Weiner, and the generous review of an earlier version by my colleagues 
Bruce Mann and Sarah Barringer Gordon. My grateful thanks to them is accompanied by full 
exoneration for any remaining errors or oversights, which are mine alone. The material in this 
article will be included, in a substantially similar form, as a chapter in THE PENNSVLVANIA 
CONS11TU110:\': A TREATISE ON INDIV1DUAL RIGI-ITS AND LIBERTIES {forthcoming 2003) to be 
published by George W. Bisel Co. which holds the copyright thereto. Research for this effort 
was supported in part by the Handler Foundation, whose financial assistance on this project is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
1 
See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of judicial Riroiew: A Constitutional Census 
of the 1 990s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 427 (1997). 
2 William Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 
489 (1977). 
12 
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constitutional jurisprudence in light of the text, history, structure and 
traditions of Pennsylvania's constitution.3 
This article is an effort to provide the materials with which to en-
gage in that elaboration in the area of free expression. It is the first 
sustained examination of Pennsylvania's constitutional guarantees of 
free speech and press since the dawn of the twentieth century,4 and to 
my knowledge, the first comprehensive study to synthesize the two 
and a quarter century history of Pennsylvania's protection of free ex-
• 5 pression. 
3 See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) (analyzing and announcing 
structure for inquiry to guide development of independent Pennsylvania jurisprudence). Ed-
munds was preceded by a decade of cases construing some protections of the Pennsylvania con-
stitution independently from their federal counterparts. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Melilli, 555 
A.2d 1254 (Pa. 1989); Commonwealth v. Blystone, 549 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. 
Miller 518 A.2d 1187 (Pa. 1986): Commonwealth v. Sell 470 A.2d 457, 460 (Pa. 1983) (obseJV-
ing that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had interpreted the state constitution as affording 
greater protection to defendants than the federal constitution): Commonwealth v. Dejohn, 403 
A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979) (declining to follow the United States Supreme Court's reasoning when 
analyzing the state constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures); and 
Commonwealth v. Platou, 312 A.2d 29 (Pa. 1973) (noting the difference in wording in the 
Pennsylvania constitution's search and seizure protection). One of the first self-conscious ef-
forts along this line was the free expression decision of William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 
173 A.2d 59 (Pa. 1961). 
4 
The task was last undertaken by Thomas Raeburn White in COMMENTARIES ON TilE 
CONSTITimON OF PENNSU.V ANIA 82-97 ( 1907). Cf. CHARLES L. BUCKALEW, AN EXAMINATION OF 
TilE CONSTinmON OF PENNSYLVANIA 12-13, 23 (1883). Robert Woodside's treatise, 
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITimONAL LAW ( 1985) contains no discussion of the free expression pro-
visions. 
5 
Each of the 50 state constitutions, of course, contains free expression protections. A use-
ful overview can be found in 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITimONAL LAW: LmGATING 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAI!'viS AND DEFENSE'S 5-1 to 5-96 (3d ed. 2000); see also id. at 9-1 to 9-37 
(discussing application of state free expression guarantees to non-public actors): ROBERT F. 
WIWAMS, STATE CONSTinmONAL LAW, CAsE'S AND MATERIALS 270-84 (3d ed. 1999) (also dis-
cussing application of state free expression guarantees to non-public actors): Susan King, State 
Constitutional Law Bibliography: 1989-1999, 31 RUTGERS LJ. 1623, 1691 (2000) (collecting recent 
articles on state free speech jurisprudence). The free expression opinions of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court on occasion make mention of parallel discussion in other courts. See, e.g., W. 
Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331, 1338 
(Pa. 1986) (distinguishing California cases on shopping center access, noting "[t]he highest 
courts of other jurisdictions are divided on this issue"); Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382, 
1389 {Pa. 1981) (making reference to New Jersey and California cases regarding access to 
shopping centers by protestors); Commonwealth v. Nelson, 104 A.2d 133, 135 (Pa. 1954), affd 
sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (dicta citing New Jersey case regarding 
vagueness of "incitement to hatred" statutes); Commonwealth v. Geuss, 76 A.2d 500 {Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1950), aifd, 81 A.2d 553 (Pa. 1951) (making reference to New Jersey case regarding loud-
speakers). For the most part, however, analysis of Pennsylvania free expression issues has pro-
ceeded without reference to the jurisprudence of other states. 
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I. PENNSYLVANIA'S HERITAGE 
A. The Framing of the Pennsylvania Free Expression Clauses 
In its current form, Pennsylvania's constitution extends protection 
to free expression in two sections. 
Article I, Section 7 provides: 
(a]The printing press shall be free to every person who may undertake to 
examine the proceedings of the Legislature or any branch of govern-
ment, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. 
[b] The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the in-
valuable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write and print 
on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. 
(c] No conviction shall be had in any prosecution for the publication of 
papers relating to the official conduct of officers or men in public capac-
ity, or to any other matter proper for public investigation or information, 
where the fact that such publication was not maliciously or negligently 
made shall be established to the satisfaction of the jury; and in all indict-
ments for libels the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the 
facts, under the direction of the court, as in other cases.6 
Article I, Section 20 adds: "The citizens have a right in a peaceable 
manner to assemble together for their common good, and to apply to 
those invested with the powers of government for redress of griev-
ances or other proper purposes by petition, address or remon-
strance." 
These provisions are hardly recent innovations. In 1776, a decade 
and a half before the adoption of the federal Bill of Rights, the Con-
stitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania embodied the pro-
tection of free expression in three separate provisions. Pennsylva-
nia's 1776 Declaration of Rights identified rights of speech, press, 
6 The official constitutional language is a single uninterrupted paragraph. I have taken the 
liberty of adding bracketed subsections to facilitate discussion of the separate elements of the 
section. The language of Article I, Section 7[c] was said to be "repugnant to" federal First 
Amendment standards, but severable from the remainder of Article I, Section 7 in Common-
wealth v. Armao, 286 A.2d 626 (Pa. 1972). Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said 
that Armao "invalidated a portion of Article I, Section 7," Commonwealth v. Wadzinski, 422 
A.2d 124, 127 n.6 (Pa. 1980). the better reading of Armao seems to be that these provisons were 
not sufficient to save Pennsylvania's criminal libel statute from unconstitutionality under the 
federal requirements of "actual malice" for libel judgments in matters of public interest. See 
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). There is nothing in the protections provided by Ar-
ticle I, Section 7 that is inconsistent with federal mandates; they are simply insufficient. One 
would think that if the Pennsylvania legislature sought to impose criminal liability on a basis 
other than defamation (e.g., intellectual property or campaign finance provisions) for publica-
tions "proper for public investigation or information," such prosecutions would still require a 
showing of "malice or negligence" under Article I, Section 7, even if unconstrained by federal 
standards. 
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assembly, and petition in two of its provisions,7 while the Frame of 
Government added that "[t]he printing presses shall be free to every 
person who undertakes to examine the proceedings of the legisla-
ture, or any part of govemment."8 
Taken together these provisions made Pennsylvania the flagship 
of free expression in the early Republic. The protection of freedom 
of the press in Pennsylvania's constitution was mirrored by the con-
temporaneous provisions of the constitutions of seven other states.9 
Pennsylvania's, however, was the first constitution to protect "free-
dom of speech and of ·writing."10 Vermont's constitution of 1777 
adopted language identical to that of Pennsylvania. 11 But these pro-
tections of "speech" stood alone until the adoption of the First 
Amendment in 1791. Unlike its protection of freedom of the press, 
the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which preceded Pennsylvania's 
Declaration, provided no recognition of any right to assemble. 12 Al-
though the rights to petition and assembly had been claimed by the 
Continental Congress in 1774,13 until the adoption of the First 
7 The first, Article Xll, provided: "That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and 
of writing, and publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom of the press ought not to be 
restrained." PA. CONSf. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XII (1776). The second Pennsylva-
nia provision, Article XVI of Pennsylvania's 1776 Declaration of Rights, recognized: " [ t] hat the 
people have a right to assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their 
representatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress of grievances, by address, petition, or 
remonstrance." 
8 !d., Frame of Government, § 35. This freedom to examine the proceedings of the legisla-
ture was a concomitant of the participation-enhancing innovations of Sections 13, 14 and 15 of 
the 1776 Frame of Government, which guaranteed public access to legislative debates, publica-
tion of legislative records and of proposed statutes. See WIW PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN 
CONSTITIJTIONS 249-50 (Rita & Robert Kimber trans., 1980) (describing confidentiality of de-
bate in Pennsylvania assembly debates through 1764, and innovation of public access to the leg-
islative process in the 1776 constitution). The constitutional mandates of open legislative de· 
bates and records was retained in modified form in the 1790 Constitution, PA CONSf. of 1790, 
Frame of Government§§ 14-15 (1790), and preserved unchanged to the present 1968 Constitu-
tion. PACONSf. of 1968, art. II,§§ 12-13 (1968). 
9 See Georgia, GA. CO!'\ST. of 1777, art. LXI ( 1777); Massachusett~. MASS. CONSf. Declara-
tion of Rights, pt. 1, art. XVI (1780); Maryland, MD. CONSf. of 1776, art. XXXVII (1776); New 
Hampshire, N.H. CONSf, pt. I, an. XXII (1784); North Carolina, N.C. CONSf. of 1776, art. XV 
(1776); South Carolina, S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XLUI (1778); and Virginia, VA. CONST. of 
1776, Bill of Rights § 12 (1776). See also LIV1NGSTON ROWE SCHL'YLER, THE UBERTY OF TilE 
PRESS IN THE AMERICA.'l COLONIES BEFORE TilE REVOLUTIONARYW AR 77 ( 1905). 
10 SCHlhLER, supra note 9, at 77. 
11 Vf. CONSf. of 1777, art. XIV (1793). 
12 J. PAULSELSA.\1, THEPENNSYLVANIACONsrrrtmONOF 1776178 (1936). 
13 Continental Cong., N.C. D. 8 Oct 14, 1774, reprinted in JACK N. RAKOVE, DEaARING 
RIGHTS 63-68 (1998); 1 Annals ofCong., 731-45, reproduced, The Founders' Constitution Vol-
ume 5, Amendment I (Petition and Assembly), Document 13, available at http:/ /press-pubs. 
uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendl_assemblys13.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2002) 
("That they have a right peaceably to assemble, consider of their grievances, and petition the 
king; and that all prosecutions, prohibitory proclamations, and commitments for the same, are 
illegal."). 
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Amendment, Pennsylvania's freedom of assembly provision was mir-
rored only by Vermone4 and North Carolina. 15 
Under its first constitution, the Commonwealth experienced both 
a profusion of what would today be called "uninhibited robust wide-
open debate,"16 and sporadic, largely unsuccessful efforts by officials 
to curb criticism. 17 
These efforts climaxed in 1788 with Republica v. Oswald. 18 Conten-
tious newspaper editor Eleazer Oswald had found himself subject to 
civil arrest in the course of a libel suit brought by Andrew Browne, 
the "master of a female academy in the city of Philadelphia," and a 
14 VT. CONST. of 1777, art. XVIII (1793). 
15 N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. X\1111 ( 1776). 
16 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See SEl.SAM, supra note 12, at 181 
(quoting a contemporary observer as commenting "[i]t arouses the sympathies to see how often 
the Congress is mishandled in these sheets"). Similarly, Dwight L. Teeter's study, A Legacy of 
Expression: Philadelphia Newspapers and Congress During the War for Independence 1775-
1783 (1967) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Universicy of Wisconsin) is replete with accounts 
of the vituperative press skirmishes in Philadelphia during the period after the adoption of 
Pennsylvania's first constitution. See id. at 258-62 (explaining that newspaper publishers "acted 
as if they had little to fear from publishing severe criticism of the Constitution and government 
of Pennsylvania;" "printers apparently held the courts in little awe"); see also NORMAN L. 
ROSENBERG, PROTEGnNG 11-IE BFSr MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF 11-IE LAW OF LIBEL 60 
( 1986) (remarking on "the almost total absence of political libel suits" during the 1780s and 
1790s); Dwight L. Teeter, Press Freedom and the Pu!Jlic Printing: Pennsylvania, 1775-83, 45 
JOURNAUSMQ. 445,446-47 (1968) (recounting "choice bits of vituperation," officials "peddling 
official blunders by the groce [sic]," officials accused of profiteering, one judge characterized as 
judge Grinner, or 'The Excrescence,"' published by Philadelphia printers "beyond the reach 
of effective governmental retaliation"); ROBERT L. BRUNHOUSE, THE COL'NTER-REVOLUTION IN 
PENNSYLVM1A 1776-1790 5 (1971) ("In the 1780s the press descended to unbelievable depths of 
repulsive muckraking."); see id. at 125 (describing vituperation "that descended to such depths 
as to approach the obscene"); see also id. at 289 n.ll (describing cartoons and "filthy attacks"). 
17 Libel prosecutions were brought to suppress political criticism with only sporadic effect. 
See JOHN K. ALEXANDER, PENNSYLVA."'IA, PIONEER IN SAFEGUARDING PERSONAL RIGHI'S IN 11-IE 
BILL OF RIGHI'S AND 11-IE STATES 325-27 (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds., 1992) (de-
scribing events of 1782 during which publisher Eleazer Oswald attacked Pennsylvania's Chief 
Justice Thomas McKean as biased and unfair, was arrested at McKean's orders for seditious li-
bel, and was ultimately saved from prosecution by the repeated refusal of a grand jury to indict 
him); Teeter, supra note 16, at 79-80, UO (describing the seditious libel law adopted by Penn-
syhoania's Provisional Constitutional Convention); id. at 229-31 (describing repeated unsuccess-
ful efforts by Justice McKean to induce the grand jury to indict Eleazer Oswald for libel). For 
other accounts of the conflict between McKean and Oswald, see Teeter's The Printer and the Chief 
justice: Seditious Lwel in 1782-83, 45 JOURNAUSM Q. 235 (1968) and ROSENBERG, supra note 16, at 
60. The public commitment to libercy of expression in this early period, however, fell consid-
erably short of modern standards in other areas. See, e.g., ROBERT L. BRUNHOUSE, THE 
COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN PENNStl.VANIA 1776-1790 16-21 (1971) (describing loyalcy oath of 
1776 prerequisite to voting that was interpreted to prevent working for changes in the constitu-
tion); id. at 40-41 (describing loyalcy oath of I 777 prerequisite to voting, suing for debts, and 
transferring real estate); id. at 77-79 (describing 1779 abolition of College of Philadelphia be-
cause of political opposition of Trustees); id. at 127 (describing 1782 statute mandating death 
penalcy for adherents of secessionist movement); id. at 147 (describing 1783 refusal to legalize 
theatrical entertainment in Philadelphia). 
18 I U.S. (I Dall.) 319 (1788). See Teeter, supra note 16, at 237-39. 
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friend of Oswald's political opponents. In response, Oswald pub-
lished a bitter attack on all of the parties to the libel action, alleging 
that both the plaintiff and the court had sought to exact political ret-
ribution against him, making the claim that "the doctrine of libels" 
was incompatible with Pennsylvania's constitutional protection of free 
communication and free press, and voicing the hope that his "fellow 
citizens" would vindicate him in the impending jury trial. Oswald 
thereupon found himself hailed before the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court to defend against charges of contempt of court. 
The opinion of Justice McKean, who had previously attempted 
without success to punish Oswald for his criticism of McKean him-
self, 19 began by affirming the "doctrine of libels" that Oswald denied: 
"libeling is a great crime, whatever sentiments may be entertained by 
those who live by it," announced Justice McKean, "the heart of the li-
beler ... is more dark and base than that of the assassin."20 Pennsyl-
vania's protection of freedom of the press, according to the opinion, 
"[precludes] any attempt to fetter the press by the institution of ali-
censer" and gives "every citizen a right of investigating the conduct of 
those who are intrusted [sic] with the public business."21 But while 
the constitution authorized "candid commentary" and "permits every 
man to publish his opinion," once publication occurred an individual 
was protected against subsequent legal action in only the case of 
"[publications] meant for use and reformation ... with an eye solely 
to the public good." Publications meant to "delude and defame" 
were unprotected, and since in the view of Justice McKean, the evi-
dent "object and tendency" of Oswald's publications was to "raise a 
prejudice against his antagonist, in the minds of those that must ul-
timately determine the dispute between them" and to "dishonor the 
administration of justice," Oswald's publications were subject to pun-
'h f ~ IS ment as contempts o court. 
The Constitutional Convention of 1790 rewrote Pennsylvania's 
free expression provisions into the lineal ancestors of their current 
form. All of the provisions were consolidated in the Declaration of 
Rights, which was promulgated as the final article (Article IX) of the 
19 McKean endeavored to have Oswald indicted for criticizing him seven years earlier. See 
supra note 17. 
20 Oswald. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 324. McKean was an enthusiast for the law of libel. In addition 
to his prior effortS regarding Mr. Oswald, he successfully obtained a £5700 libel verdict against 
another printer. Teeter, supra note 16, at 125. See Commonwealth v. Duane, I Binn. 97 (Pa. 
1804) (libel prosecution for statements regarding McKean as governor of Pennsylvania); 
Respublica v. Gobbet, 3 Yeates 93 (1800) (McKean as Supreme Court Justice imposed $2000 
bond conditioned on good behavior of publisher). 
21 Oswald, 1 U.S. (I Dall.) at 326. 
22 
ld. Oswald was fined £10 and imprisoned for one month. ld. at 328. His effort to obtain 
relief in Pennsylvania's unicameral legislature failed after several days of discussion by a vote of 
34-23. ld. 
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1790 constitution. Introduced by the new admonition "[t]hat the 
general, great, and essential principles of liberty and free Govern-
ment may be recognized and unalterably established, WE 
DEClARE," Article IX concluded (Section XXVI): "Everything in this 
article is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall 
for ever remain inviolate. "23 
Protections of press and speech which had previously appeared in 
both the Frame of Government and the Declaration of Rights were 
consolidated in a new section of the Declaration of Rights (Section-
VII), "Of the liberty of the press," which read (as revised): 
[a] That the printing presses shall be free to every person who under-
takes to examine the proceedings of the legislature, or any branch of 
government: And no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. 
[b] The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the in-
valuable rights of man; and every citizen may freely speak, write and print 
on any su~ect, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. 
[ c] In prosecutions for the publication of papers, investigating the official 
conduct of officers, or men in a public capacity, or where the matter pub-
lished is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in 
evidence: And, in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have a right to 
determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in 
other cases. 
24 
The right to assemble and petition was retained in Article IX, Sec-
tion 20 of the 1790 constitution in wording that has remained un-
changed to the present constitution (Article I, Section 20). Finally, 
the 1790 constitution added reputation to the "inherent and indefea-
sible" rights recognized in Section 1 of the Declaration of Rights. 25 
23 Both the introductory and concluding language were retained unchanged by subsequent 
constitutions. 
24 Sections (a] and (b] were retained unchanged in the constitutions of 1838, 1874 and 
1968, and are now contained in Article I, Section 7. Section 7(c] was retained in the constitu-
tion of I838, but amended in I874 to read: 
No conviction shall be had in any prosecution for the publication of papers relating to 
the official conduct of officers or men in public capacity, or to any other matter proper 
for public investigation or information, wlu!re the fact that such publicaticm was not mali-
ciously or negligently made shall be established to the satisfacticm of the jury; and in all indict-
ments for libels the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under 
the direction of the court, as in other cases. 
Article I, Section 7[c] (emphasis added). This substitution of a requirement of negligence or 
malice, both of which required a shov.ing of both falsehood and a state of mind, for a simple 
right to introduce truth for jury consideration was regarded as a more protective standard. See 
ROSAU!>.'DL. BRANNING, PENNS'r1.NM'IACONSTITimONALDEVELOPMEl'iT 107 (1960). 
This language was retained in the I968 constitution . 
.,; PA. CONSf., art. I,§ I (200I). Section I of the Declaration of Rights had previously an-
nounced "that all men have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which 
are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, 
and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." As revised in 1790, the Declaration of 
Rights recognized "inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and 
defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation, and 
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In this final fonn, the free expression provisions of Pennsylvania's 
constitution manifests three overlapping commitments: political, 
epistemic, and libertarian. 
B. The Political Functions of Free Speech 
It is clear from the Pennsylvania constitution's text and heritage 
that free expression serves crucial political functions. Freedom of the 
press--originally a part of the Frame of Government-is guaranteed 
to "every person who may undertake to examine the proceedings of 
the Legislature or any branch of government" (Article I, Section 
7[a]); protections against criminal prosecution are provided to pub-
lications investigating "the official conduct of officers or men in pub-
lic capacity" (Article I, Section 7[c]); citizens are protected in their 
right to assemble and "to apply to those invested with the powers of 
government" for relief (Article I, Section 20). 
1. Remonstrance and Criticism: The Checking Function 
Pennsylvania's constitutional heritage from the beginning has 
viewed freedom of expression, in the words of Philadelphia lawyer 
Andrew Hamilton, as a 
bulwark against lawless power ... a right which all freemen claim, and 
are entitled to complain when they are hurt ... to remonstrate the 
abuses of power in the strongest tenns, to put their neighbors upon their 
guard against the craft or open violence of men in authority. 26 
Shortly before the framing of the Declaration of Rights, the Conti-
nental Congress wrote in Philadelphia in 1774, 
[t]he importance of [freedom of the press] consists ... in its diffusion of 
liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready com-
munication of thoughts between sul?.jects, and its consequential promo-
of pursuing their own happiness." (emphasis added). It is not directly relevant to this essay to 
explore the alterations that omitted the proposition that the rights in question were "natural." 
or that there is a right of "pursuing . . safety" or the elimination of the right of "obtaining ... 
happiness and safety." The wording of this provision has again been retained unchanged in the 
constitutions ofl838, 1874 and 1968. It currently comprises Article I, Section 1. 
26 Andrew Hamilton, Defense of john Peter Zenger on Charge of Seditious Libel ( 1735), available at 
http:/ /www.uark.edu:80/depts/comminfo/cambridge/zenger.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2002). 
See id. (" (T]hat to which nature and the laws of our country have given us a right-the liberty-
both of exposing and opposing arbitrary power (in these parts of the world, at least) by speak-
ing and writing truth."). Hamilton's address in the Zengm-trial in New York has long been cited 
in Pennsylvania's Supreme Court as a part of Pennsylvania's constitutional heritage. See Kane v. 
C'..ommonwealth, 89 Pa. 522, 526-27 (1879); see also Bodack v. Law Enforcement Alliance of 
America, 790 A.2d 277,279 (Pa. 2001) (Castille,]., dissenting); Mack Appeal, 126 A.2d 679,683 
(Pa. 1956) (Bell, concurring and dissenting); O'Donnell v. Philadelphia Record Co., 51 A.2d 
775, 790 n.3 (Pa. 1947) (Maxey,]., dissenting); Commonwealth v. McManus, 21 A. 1018, 1020 
(Pa. 1891) (Mitchell,]., concurring). 
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tion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or in-
timidated into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs. 27 
So, too, the framers of the 1874 Constitution, though they ultimately 
limited their work to a relatively minor expansion of the protections 
against criminal libel prosecutions, articulated a high regard for the 
political functions of the press when they reenacted the Declaration 
of Rights. 28 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the 
constitutional importance of expression which brings to light the po-
tential or actual wrongdoing of government officials, and the consti-
tutional problems raised by official efforts to stifle criticism. Thus, in 
the 1835 Case of Austin, the court reversed the disbarment of attor-
neys who had criticized a common pleas court judge, commenting 
that 
[t]he conduct of a judge, like that of every other functionary, is a legiti-
mate suqject of scrutiny, and where the public good is the aim, such scru-
tiny is as open to an attorney of his court as to any other citizen . . . . [An 
attorney] is not professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official 
c~mduct o.f .the .i,Mdges, which would not expose him to legal animadver-
sion as a ottzen. 
'17 ADDRESS TO THE INHABITANTS OF Qu'EBF.C, 1774, reprinted in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A 
DOCUMENrARY HISTORY 222 (Bernard Schwanz ed., 1971) (1974). &e also Vincent Blasi, The 
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 521 (1977) (discussing the 
value of free expression as a check on the abuse of power); The Address and Reasons of Dissent of 
the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to their Constituents, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
A DOCUMENrARY HISTORY 665-68 (objecting to the "omission" of "the stipulations heretofore 
made" by state constitutions "in favour of'' "the liberty of the press, that scourge of tyrants and 
the ~rand bulwark of every other liberty"}. 
E.g., IV DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION TO AMEND THE CONSTITimON OF PENNSYLVANIA 
716-17 ( 1873) (Mr. Smith) ("Give me but liberty of the press ... and I will shake down from its 
height corruption and bury it under the ruins of the abuses it was meant to shelter ... ."); (Mr. 
Sharpe): 
It is the duty of the press to educate the public mind upon the affairs of State, to drag 
from its concealment the malfeasance of public officials, to watch and denounce all arbi-
trary acts of government ... the newspaper ought to be the wide awake sentinel and 
guardian which stands upon the watch towers of the State to protect the liberties of the 
people. 
!d. at 726; V DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION TO AMEND THE CONSTITimON OF PF.N>JS\'l.VANIA 586 
(1873) (Mr. Dallas) ("[B]ut for that single paper, the man Tweed and his subordinates ... 
would still revolve in the heaven of political power."); (Mr. Landis): 
Does any one doubt that it is the duty of the press to keep the people fully posted upon 
matters of pubic interest, and to discuss fully and freely the character and conduct of 
public men? If so he lives too late . . . . No people could exercise the elective franchise 
intelligently unless the newspapers kept them informed on such subjects .... 
!d. at 596-97; id. at 598-99 ("[The press are] public instructors, the pointers-out of that which 
requires redress, the advocates of that which ought to be introduced."); VII DEBATES OF THE 
CONVF.NTIONTOAMF.NDTHECONSTITimONOFPENNSYLVA.'o1A266 (1873) (Mr. M'Camant) ("As 
faithful sentinels upon the watchtowers of liberty, they could more effectually warn us of dan-
ger, and being forewarned we could be forearmed."). 
29 5 Raw1e 191, 205-{)6 (Pa. 1835). 
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So, too, In Re Taylor and Selby Appeals interpreted Pennsylvania's 
Newspaper Shield Law broadly in light of the observation that "inde-
pendent newspapers are today the principal watch-dogs and protec-
tors of honest, as well as good, Government."!lO Again, in Common-
wealth v. Contakos, the prevailing opinion observed, in sustaining 
constitutionally mandated access to trials, "the public and the media 
together counterbalance the possible emergence of a corrupt or bi-
ased judiciary. "~1 
The election of public officials ceases to be democratic if criticism 
of their actions or their candidacy is legally sanctionable. Thus, in 
construing the 1874 revision of Article I, Section 7 to its current form, 
the court reversed a judgment disbarring attorneys for publishing 
criticism of a sitting judge in light of the newly-established status of 
judges as elected officials. The Court observed: 
[I] t is now the right and the duty of a lawyer to bring to the notice of the 
people who elect the judges every instance of what he believes to be cor-
ruption or partisanship. No class of the community ought to be allowed 
freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capac-
ity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar . . . . To 
say that an attorney can only act or speak on this sul?ject under liability to 
be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood 
by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack 
and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment 
32 under our present system. 
Shortly thereafter, notwithstanding Pennsylvania's constitutional 
protection of reputation, the court in Briggs v. Garrett recognized a 
l<l 193 A.2d 181, 185 (Pa. 1963). See id. at 185 ("(The Shield Law's] spiritual father is the 
revered Constitutionally ordained freedom of the press."); see also Magazine Publishers of Am. v. 
Dep't of Revenue, 654 A.2d 519, 524 (Pa. 1995) ("The press plays a unique role as a check on 
government abuse, and a tax limited to the press raises concerns about censorship of critical 
information and opinion.") (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439,447 (1991)); id. at 527 
(Flaherty, J .. dis.~eming) ("The tax restrains the crucial function of the press as government 
watchdog ... ."). 
31 453 A.2d 578, 580 (Pa. 1982). The Contalws plurality was accepted as controlling in Com-
monwealth v. Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d 414 (Pa. 1987). For other accounts of the importance of 
value of public discourse as a means of checking the possible abuse of power by courts, see 
Commonwealth v. Hayes, 414 A.2d 318, 322 (Pa. 1980) (opinion of Nix,J.) ("It was thought the 
presence of the public generally would constrain a court, otherwise predisposed, to accord the 
witness a fair trial.") (quoting Commonwealth v. Trinkle, 124 A. 191, 192 (Pa. 1924)); id. at 331 
(opinion of Kaufman,].) (praising publicity as "check on judicial power"). See also id.: 
[E]vidence is to be publicly allowed or disallowed, in the face of the country; which must 
curb any secret bias or partiality that might arise in his own breast ... Wigmore noted 
that public proceedings serve a vital societal function in that they move the court, the 
parties and the witnesses more strongly ... to a strict conscientiousness in the perform-
ance of duty. 
(citations omitted); In re Johnson, 359 A.2d 739, 748 (Pa. 1976) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting) 
("Criticism by the press is in the nature of public debate: it protects the integrity of the court by 
exposing its processes to robust public review."). 
~2 Ex pane Steinman, 95 Pa. 220,238-39 (1880). 
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privilege to criticize candidates for public office with probable cause, 
even if the criticism was in fact a falsehood: 
[H]ave the voters whose suffrages [a candidate] solicits, the right to can-
vass and discuss his qualifications, openly and freely, without sul::!jecting 
themselves to fine or imprisonment, or a ruinous suit for damages? If the 
voters may not speak, write or print anything but such facts as they can 
establish with judicial certainty, the right does not exist, unless in such 
form that a prudent man would hesitate to exercise it . . . . If not, we 
have indeed fallen upon evil times, and our boasted freedom is but a de-
lusion. The principle contended for here, if sustained by this court, 
would put a padlock upon the mouth of every voter, and intelligent free 
discussion of the fitness of public men for office would cease.33 
The sum of the matter, for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, is that 
"[t]here is practically universal agreement that free discussion of 
candidates for political office is essential to the functioning of a 
democratic society.''34 
2. Self Government, Deliberation and Political Truth 
The protection of free expression under Pennsylvania's constitu-
tion is not limited to a right to remonstrate with and criticize officials 
and candidates for office. It undergirds a broader right of self gov-
ernment: the right of the citizens of Pennsylvania to inform them-
selves in order to deliberate on the issues of the day. The text of the 
constitution protects not only criticism of public officials, but all pub-
lications "proper for public information" (Article I, Section 7[c]) as 
well as the right of citizens to assemble "for the common good" (Arti-
cle I, Section 20) and to seek responses to their concerns from the 
holders of political power. :~.• 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized that, under 
Pennsylvania's structure of government, citizens have both the right 
and the "solemn duty" to consult with each other "to work out the 
public weal," as well as to address their conclusions to the constituted 
~ 2 A. 513,523-24 (Pa. 1886). 
54 Commonwealth v. Wadzinski, 422 A.2d 124, 129 (Pa. 1980). 
!IS At least one commentator viewed the original protection of free expression in Pennsylva-
nia as a part of the "[t]he determination to establish participatory politics" that characterized 
the constitution of 1776. John K Alexander, Pennsylvania, Pioneer in Safeguarding Personal Rights, 
in THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND TilE STATES 323 (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds., 1992); 
see aLso Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39, 47 ( 1873): 
The people, having reserved the right to alter or abolish their form of government, have, 
in the same declaration of their rights, reserved the means of procuring a law as the in-
strumental process of so doing. The twentieth section is as follows [quoting current Ar-
ticle I, Section 20] .... If the legislature, possessing these powers of government, be 
unwilling to pass a law to take the sense of the people, or to delegate to a convention all 
the powers the people desire to confer upon their delegates, the remedy is still in their 
own hands; they can elect new representatives that will. 
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authorities.S6 Thus, in Kirmse v. Adler, the court held that the right of 
labor unions "to present their cause to the public by circulars calcu-
lated to induce others to stand with them" found protection under 
the Pennsylvania constitution.37 Again, in Boettger v. Loverro, in the 
course of holding that Pennsylvania's wiretap law could not be ap-
plied to punish newspaper publication of lawfully obtained material, 
the court observed, "[i]t is the freedom of dissemination of informa-
tion and ideas of public importance that is the bonding agent in a 
democracy."38 And in Commonwealth v. Tate, in affirming the inde-
pendent Pennsylvania protection of free speech and assembly, the 
court announced, 
[t]he 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' has special 
meaning for this Commonwealth, whose founder, William Penn, was 
prosecuted in England for the 'crime' of preaching to an unlawful as-
sembly and persecuted by the court for daring to proclaim his right to a 
'alb d. 39 tn y an uncoerce JUry. 
Penn himself and the colonial Quakers of Pennsylvania were less 
than unwavering in their commitment to freedom of speech and 
press, as the experience of William Bradford, the first printer in 
Pennsylvania, illustrates.40 In 1687 the Friend's Meeting ordered 
36 Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, ll3 A. 70, 72 (Pa. 1921). See also Commonwealth v. Tate, 
432 A.2d 1382, 1388 (Pa. 1981) ("[P]rotection given speech and press was fashioned to assure 
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by 
the people.") (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)); Parker v. Common-
wealth, 6 Pa. 507, 514 (1847) (declaring that the people of Pennsylvania, by vesting power in 
the General Assembly, "solemnly and emphatically divested themselves of all right, directly, to 
make or declare the law, or to interfere with the ordinary legislation of the state, otherwise than 
in the manner pointed out in art. ix., sect. 20"). 
~7 166A. 566,569 (Pa. 1933). 
38 587 A.2d 712, 720 (Pa. 1991). Boettger construed the First Amendment, but the court has 
been equally emphatic when directly addressing the Pennsylvania constitution that Pennsylva-
nia's free expression guaranties protect discourse which "disseminates political knowledge, and 
by adding to the common stock of freedom, gives a just confidence to every individual." 
Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates 266, 269 (1805). See Qark v. Allen 204 A.2d 42, 47 (Pa. 1964) 
(holding accusation of "communistic tendencies" was not libelous and if considered so "would 
realistically and practically put an effective stop to searching and illuminating discussion and 
debate"). 
~J 432 A.2d 1382, 1388 (Pa. 1981) (citations omitted); see also Bodack v. Law Enforcement 
Alliance, 790 A.2d 277, 279 (Pa. 2002) (Castille,J., dissenting) (quoting Tate, 432 A.2d at 1388). 
As the court recounted in Commonwealth v. Contalws, 453 A.2d 578,580-81 (Pa. 1982): 
In 1670 William Penn and William Mead were tried before a jury at the Old Bailey in 
London on an indictment of unlawful assembly, disturbing the peace, and "causing a 
great concourse and tumult." Penn had addressed a group of three hundred Quakers in 
Grace Church Street, London, after the Quakers had found their meeting house locked 
by order of the crown . . . . He considered the charges against him to be in violation of 
the Great Charter of 1225 and the earlier version, the Magna Carta. 
(citations omitted) 
40 See SCHlNLER, supra note 9, at 23-28. 
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Bradford to obtain prior approval from them before printing any ma-
terial that "Concerns Friends or Truth." In 1689, Bradford printed 
Penn's charter, was summoned before Pennsylvania's Governor and 
Council, and was bound on £500 security not to print anything with-
out Governor's permission. The Governor invoked both the interest 
and orders of William Penn. In 1692, Bradford was arrested for sedi-
tious libel; although the jury "could not agree" on his conviction 
Bradford was held over until next term and his tools and letters were 
released only when Penn was deprived of the colony in 1693.41 In 
1721, Andrew Bradford (William's son) was interrogated by Governor 
Sir William Keith, warned not to publish comments on his conduct 
without official consent but Bradford continued to publish. 42 During 
the period 1756-59, the Pennsylvania Assembly sought to silence crit-
ics by arresting and trying them for libel; the English Privy Council 
ordered their discharge on procedural grounds.43 
Nonetheless, in construing Pennsylvania's "great heritage of free-
dom,"44 one must take account, as justice Harlan put it with regard to 
federal constitutional traditions, of "what history teaches are the tra-
ditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it 
broke."45 By the time of the revolution, the press in Pennsylvania was 
typified by robust and indeed vituperative public debate. 46 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has viewed the earlier colonial excursions 
into the suppression of free expression as vices against which Penn-
sylvania's constitution sought to guard.47 
C. Free Expression and The Search for Knowledge 
When the Continental Congress praised the virtues of a free press 
in Philadelphia in 1774, it highlighted the importance of a free press 
to the "advancement of truth, science, morality."-18 So, too, in 1824, 
Updegraph v. Commonwealth acknowledged the protected status of 
communications which sought to "prove any supposed truths" or "de-
41 For discussion of the 1692 prosecution, see Alexander, supra note 35, at 317-319 (describ-
ing Bradford's trial). See also William Goldman Theatri!S v. Dana, 173 A.2d 59, 67 (Pa. 1961 ); The 
Proprietar v. George Keith (1692), reported in PE~VAl'<IA COLONlAL CAsES 117 (Samuel W. Pen-
nypacker ed., 1892). 
42 Alexander, supra note 35. 
<S !d.; SCHUYLER, supra note 9, at 27-28. 
41 Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382, 1389 (Pa. 1981). 
45 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Har1an,J., dissenting). 
46 See supra note 16. 
47 See William Goldman Theatres v. Dana, 173 A.2d 59 72 (Pa. 1961) ("The members of the 
Constitutional Convention of 1790 were undoubtedly fully cognizant of the vicissitudes and out-
right suppressions to which printing had theretofore been subjected in this very colony."). 
46 IJOUR'W.SOFTHECONTINENTALCONGRESS 108 (Worthington Chambers Forded., 1904) 
(1774). 
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teet supposed error."49 The constitutional heritage of Pennsylvania 
acknowledges that governmental censorship is a bar to the advance-
ment of knowledge. As Justice Holmes maintained on the federal 
level, 
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas--that 
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon 
which their wishes safely can be carried out. 50 
D. Free Expression and Freedom of Thought 
The political and epistemic roles of free expression are essentially 
consequentialist; they rest on the utility of free expression as a means 
of attaining other goals. Yet Pennsylvania's constitutional values en-
compass as well an intrinsic regard for liberty of expression as an 
element of human dignity. In 1790 Pennsylvania amended its consti-
tution specifically to announce that "the free communication of 
thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man." It has 
retained this declaration unchanged through three constitutional re-
visions over the last two hundred years. This commitment points to a 
third and complementary grounding for freedom of expression in 
Pennsylvania's constitutional heritage: free expression is an element 
of personal autonomy of thought that underpins the freedoms guar-
anteed by the rest of the constitution. 
49 
II Serg. & Rawle 394, 409 (1824). See id. at 405 ("Upon the whole, it may not be going 
too fur to infer, from the decisions, that no author or printer, who fairly and conscientiously 
promulgates the opinions with whose truths he is impressed, for the benefit of others, is an-
swerable as a criminal."). Updegraph stated that an indictment for blasphemy against statements 
it regarded as directed toward ridiculing religion rather than "proving truth" or "defeating er-
ror" was indictable, notwithstanding constitutional protections, but dismissed the indictment 
because it was improperly drawn. 
50 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 ( 1919) (Holmes,]., dissenting). In In re Chalk, 
272 A.2d 457 (Pa. 1971), the court sustained a challenge under Article I, Section 7 to the dis-
missal of a welfare caseworker because: 
\Vhether his statements were true, or false, need not concern us, for this is a question 
which could not meaningfully be answered by either the York County Board, or the Civil 
Service Commission. Appellant was addressing himself to matters of public policy, 
where, the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market. 
272 A.2d at 461 (quoting Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630), See al.!o Inn- Schlesinger, 172 A.2d 835, 843 
(Pa. 1961} (invoking "jefferson's classic admonition in his First Inaugural Address that, 'If there 
be any among us who would v.ish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form, let 
them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be toler-
ated where reason is left free to combat it'"); Kraemer Hosiery Co. v. Am. Fed'n of Full Fash-
ioned Hosiery Workers, !57 A. 588,603 (Pa. 1931) (Maxey,]., dissenting): 
[l]deas are not subject to injunction. Ideas have far-reaching effects. Some of these ef-
fects may be good and some may be evil, but it is opposed to progress and contrary to the 
spirit of our institutions to intrust [sic] any official with the arbitrary power to say what 
ideas shall be liberated and what ideas shall be suppressed. 
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Pennsylvania's heritage of liberty of conscience found its most 
prominent recognition in the sphere of religious freedom.51 But in 
this respect the regard for religious conscience is congruent with a 
regard for freedom of thought, belief, and inquiry more generally.52 
The root of Blackstone's special disapprobation of prior restraints, 
invoked by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in William Goldman Thea-
ters, Inc. v. Dana, is that if prior restraints are prohibited, "the will of 
individuals is still left free . . . . Neither is any restraint hereby laid 
upon frec;dom of thought or inquiry: liberty of private sentiment is 
still left.""3 So, too, the court has observed that, "direct restraints 
upon expression impose restrictions on human thought and strike at 
the core of liberty in a way which limitations on access to information 
do not."54 
More recently, in Commonwealth v. Bricker,55 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held that, even absent an effort to participate in politi-
51 
See, e.g., Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd. v. Fink, 532 A.2d 358, 369 {Pa. 1987) {quoting 
Commonwealth v. Eubanks, 512 A.2d 619 (Pa. 1986)): 
Pennsylvania, more than any other sovereignty in history, traces its origins directly to the 
principle that the fundamental right of conscience is inviolate . . . . A citizen of this 
Commonwealth is free, of longstanding right, to practice a religion or nor.. as he sees fit, 
and whether he practices a religion is strictly and exclusively a private matter, not a mat-
ter for inquiry by the state. 
(citations omitted) 
See also Updegraph v. Commonwealth, II Serg. & Rawle 394, 409 (1824): 
When our ancestors emigrated from England, they took with them such of the English 
principles as were convenient for the situation in which they were about to be placed. It 
required time and experience to ascertain how much of the English law would be suit-
able to this country. The minds of William Penn and his followers, would have revolted 
at the idea of an established church. Liberty to all, preference to none; equal privilege is 
extended to the mitred Bishop and the unadorned Friend. 
(emphasis omitted) 
For discussions of the background of Pennsylvania's commitment to freedom of conscience, 
see, for example, J. WilliAM FROST, A PERFECT FREEOOM: REUGIOUS L!BERlY IN PENNSYLVA.'<IA 
{ 1990); SALLY SCHWARTZ, A MIXED MULTITIJDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR TOLERATION IN COWI'.'IAL 
PENNSYLVANIA (1987); DIETMAR ROTiiERMUND, THE LAYMAN'S PROGRESS: REUGIOUS AND 
POUTICAL EXPERIENCE IN COL01'<1AL PENNSYLVA.'<IA {1961); PATRiaA U. BONOMI, UNDER THE 
COPE OF HEAVEN: REUGJON, SOCIElY, A."'D POUTICS IN COWNIAL AMERICA { 1986) 168-81; Arlin 
M. ~dams & Charles]. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559 {1989). 
SeeDuftY v. Cooke, 86 A. 1076, 1077-78 (Pa. 1913): 
The Constitution of 1790 provided against discrimination on account of religious senti-
ments .... The opinion was widely disseminated that routine offices and employments 
were conferred because the appointee held certain political sentiments .... Such a state 
of facts, if it existed, would have ... amounted not to a legal, but to an actual, disqualifi-
cation on account of political sentiments . . . . There is everything in the spirit of the 
Constitution to prohibit such proscription . . . 
55 173 A.2d 59, 62 (Pa. 1961) (quoting 4 WilliAM BIACKSTOJ>..'E, COMMENTARIES *151-52) 
{footnote omitted). 
51 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.Jerome, 387 A.2d 425,433 n.16 {Pa. 1978). 
5.' 666A.2d 257 {Pa. 1995). 
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cal dialogue, the use of a flag for interior decoration was constitu-
tionally protected expression. It declared: 
There are few forms of self-expression as personal and important as the 
manner in which we decorate our homes. We have long recognized the 
sanctity of the home in this Commonwealth as we have repeatedly stated 
that "upon closing the door to one's home to the outside world, a person 
may legitimately expect the highest degree of privacy known to our soci-
ety." Clearly, there is no precise constitutional calculus as to what consti-
tutes constitutionally protected expression. However, we believe that the 
government must satisfY constitutional scrutiny before it can tell the citi-
zens of this Commonwealth what pictures they may hang on their walls or 
what symbols they may display in the sanctity of their homes.56 
The grounding of Pennsylvania's right to free communication of 
thoughts and opinions in intellectual autonomy is manifest as well in 
the protection of the right to decline to communicate. As long as the 
citizen remains free to disavow statements she is forced to adopt, the 
arguments from a "marketplace of ideas" or a "right to remonstrate" 
against compelled communications are difficult to maintain, since 
any compelled expression can be remedied by the citizen's right to 
communicate affirmatively. By contrast, if intellectual autonomy is at 
the root of the rights of communication, being required to speak 
what one does not believe is constitutionally offensive even if one is 
not barred from speaking one's true beliefs. 
In 1967, the Pennsylvania Sugreme Court held in Dudek v. Pitts-
burgh City Fire Fighters, Local No. 1 that the guarantees of the Pennsyl-
vania constitution barred an effort to compel the plaintiff to engage 
in speech to which he objected. The Court observed, 
[i]t is just as illegal to compel one to speak when he prefers to remain si-
lent as it is to gag one when he wishes to talk . . . The liberty to write or 
speak includes the c~nresponding right to be silent and also the liberty to 
decline to write .... 58 
56 
ld. at 261 (quoting Commonwealth v. Brian 656 A.2d 287,289 {Pa. 1994)). 
57 228 A.2d 752 {Pa. 1967). 
58 ld. at 755 {citation omitted). See id. at 758 (Roberts,]., concurring) ("(T]he principle of 
free speech is deeply rooted in our law and in our vision of a free society. That principle is as 
much violated by requiring a man to speak what he does not believe, as it is by prohibiting him 
from expressing what he does believe."). The parallel case in First Amendment jurisprudence 
makes even clearer the link to Pennsylvania's heritage. In West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
neue, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943), the court observed that a mandatory flag salute "requires the 
individual to communicate by word and sign his acceptance of the political ideas it thus be-
speaks. Objection to this form of communication when coerced is an old one, well known to 
the framers of the Bill of Rights." The court recalls that "[t]he Quakers, William Penn in· 
eluded, suffered punishment rather than uncover their heads in deference to any ci\~1 author-
ity." !d. at 633 n.J3. See also 6 HOWELL'S STATE TRIAlS 951, 956 (1661-1678) (account by Wil-
liam Penn and William Mead of their trial at the Old Bailey in 1670 in which Penn was fined for 
refusing to remove his hat). 
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It is this intellectual and spiritual autonomy which the Pennsylva-
nia constitution recognizes as the precondition for a free society. As 
the court commented in Commonwealth v. Tate, 
The observation of the Supreme Court of the United States with regard 
to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution applies equally 
to the Pennsylvania Constitution: "freedom of speech ... [is] protected 
against censorship or punishment .... For the alternative would lead to 
standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant politi-
cal or community groups."59 
II. THE STRUCTURE OF PROTECTION 
A. Prior Restraint 
Unlike the federal constitution, where the strictures against prior 
restraint are a matter of inference from a relatively opaque provi-
sion,60 the clearest principle to emerge from Pennsylvania's constitu-
tional text is that, as the court put it in Respublica v. Dennie in 1805, a 
citizen is free to "[p]ublish as you please in the first instance without 
control .... "61 
Pennsylvania's original protections of free expression adjured, 
"freedom of the press ought not be restrained."62 As noted above, in 
Respublica v. Oswald, Justice McKean equated the "restraint" prohib-
ited by the 1776 constitution with the licensing schemes of prior re-
straint which had been overturned in the British struggle for freedom 
of the press during the seventeenth century. According to Justice 
McKean, the protections 1776 gave 
to every citizen a right of investigating the conduct of those who are in-
trusted [sic] with the public business; and they effectually preclude any 
attempt to fetter the press by the institution of a licenser .... The true 
59 
432 A.2d 1382, 1388 (Pa. 1981) (citations omitted). See also Duggan v. 807 Liberty Ave. 
Inc., 288 A.2d 750, 754 (Pa. 1972) ("[F]reedom of thought and speech ... is the matrix, the 
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom. With rare aberrations a perva-
sive recognition of that truth can be traced in our history, political and legal.") (quoting Palko 
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,326-27 (1937)). 
60 
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 ( 1971); Organization for a Better 
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Shutdesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); 
Nearv. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 712-21 (1931); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 461 (1907) 
(relying on Respublica v. Oswald, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 319 (1788) ). 
61 
4 Yeates 267, 269 ( 1805). See also William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 173 A.2d 59, 
62 (Pa. 1961) ("[!]tis clear enough that what [the provision of Article I, § 7] was designed to do 
was to prohibit the imposition of prior restraints upon the communication of thoughts and 
opinions, leaving the utterer liable only for an abuse of the privilege. History supports this 
view."), quoted with appraval in Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Con-
necticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331, 1335 (Pa. 1986) and Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 
A.2d 1382, 1388 (Pa. 1981). 
62 PA. CONSf. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XII (1776). 
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liberty of the press is amply secured by permitting every man to publish 
his opinion; but [once published] it is due to the peace and dignity of 
society, to inquire into the motives of such publications, and to distin-
guish between those which are meant for use and reformation, and with 
an eye solely to the gublic good, and those which are intended merely to 
delude and defame. 
29 
In amending the provisions to their current form in 1790, the Penn-
sylvania Convention retained the proviso that, "no law shall ever be 
made to restrain the right" of examining any branch of government 
in the press, and added that "every citizen may freely speak, write and 
print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty."64 
The text of the constitution thus establishes a right to "write, speak 
and print" without prior restraint, leaving harms caused by free ex-
pression to subsequent "responsibility for abuse."65 
This clear commitment provided the basis for the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court's 1961 decision in William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. 
Dana,(jj invalidating Pennsylvania's regime of motion picture regula-
tion, which required that an exhibitor register with the Board of Mo-
tion Picture Control forty-eight hours in advance of any initial show-
ing, and empowered the board to disapprove a film as "obscene" or 
"unsuitable for children" by majority vote. The Court held that pro-
cedure to be an invalid "pre-censorship" inconsistent with Article I, 
Section 7, notwithstanding the facts that obscenity was punishable at 
common law, and that the United States Supreme Court had upheld 
a film censorship regime under First Amendment analysis earlier the 
67 same year. 
"' Oswald, 1 U.S. at 325. See id. at 329 (addressing the General Assembly, one of its members, 
Mr. Lewis, supported McKean's opinion through the following statement: "[h]ere then, is to be 
discerned the genuine meaning of this section in the bill of rights . . . . Every man may publish 
what he pleases; but, it is at his peril, if he publishes any thing which violates the rights of an-
other, or interrupts the peace and order of society .... "). 
"" PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 7 (1790). This wording was retained unaltered to the pres-
ent constitution. SeeP A. CONST. art. I, § 7 (200 I). 
65 
See Dennie, 4 Yeates at 267; Commonwealth v. Duane, 1 Binn. 98, 100 (Pa. 1806) 
(Tilghman, C,J.) ("[T]his provision was intended to prevent men's ""Titings from being subject 
to the previous examination and control of an officer appointed by the government, as is the 
practice in many parts of Europe, and was once the practice in England .... "). 
66 173 A.2d 59 (Pa. 1961). 
67 
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961). The Pennsylvania Court com-
mented: "[t]hat case in no way involved the rights guaranteed the individual by the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution." Dana, 173 A.2d at 65. The Pennsylvania Court had upheld an earlier film 
censorship statute against challenge under the Pennsylv-ania's free speech protections without 
substantial discussion in Buffalo Branch, Mut. Film Cmp. v. Breitingl'T, 95 A. 433 (Pa. 1915) (per 
curiam), relying on an opaque opinion by the common pleas court. The Pennsylvania Court 
referred to the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Mutual Film, 236 U.S. 230, 244 
(1915), which held that motion pictures were not "part of the press of the country or ... organs 
of public opinion" protected by the Ohio constitution. According to the Pennsylvania Supreme 
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There is some debate as to exactly which legal regimes or interfer-
ences transgress Pennsylvania's constitutional hostility to prior re-
straints. On one side of the spectrum, administrative regimes which 
give officials discretion to block entirely the publication of materials 
without their prior authorization are impermissible. They fall clearly 
afoul of Blackstone's admonition that "[t)o subject the press to the 
restrictive power of a licenser ... is to subject all freedom of senti-
ment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and 
infallible jud~ of all controverted points in learning, religion, and 
government." 
On the other hand, not every reduction in the flow of information 
is a "prior restraint." If the prior restraint doctrine were rooted solely 
in the proposition that government should not be able to exercise 
discretion over the information available to the public, then any ac-
tion which prevents the news media from obtaining information 
would constitute a prior restraint. Although the position has been 
advanced by news media seeking access to information,69 this is not 
the law under Pennsylvania's free expression guarantees. The right 
to "freely speak, write and print" prevents the government from im-
posing prior censorship on the "communication" of "thoughts and 
opinions," but provides no untrammeled right to obtain information 
in order to form those opinions. Thus, the court's 1978 decision in 
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerom/0 rejected the proposition that 
orders limiting public access to pre-trial suppression hearings crimi-
nal proceedings were prior restraints: 
A prior restraint prevents publication of information or material in the 
possession of the press and is presumed unconstitutional. These orders, 
however, issued in compliance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure, did 
not prevent petitioners from publishing any information in their posses-
sion or from 'Writing whatever they pleased and therefore did not consti-
tute a prior restraint upon publication. 71 
Court, Mutual Film was "in accord with that of the learned Common Pleas in these cases." Mu-
tual Film, 95 A. at 440. 
68 4 WJWAMBI.ACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52, quoted with approval in Dana, 173 A.2d at 
62. See also Willing v. Mazzocone, 393 A.2d 1155, 1157 (Pa. 1978) (Mandarino,].) (quoting with 
approval). 
00 Cf McLaughlin v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 348 A.2d 376, 384 (Pa. 1975) (Roberts, 
J., dissenting) ("Silence imposed by refusing to inform is indistinguishable in effect from silence 
imP.osed by curtailing the speech of those already informed."). 
'lfl 387 A.2d 425 (Pa. 1978). 
71 
!d. at 432-33 (citations omitted). See McLaughlin, 348 A.2d at 378 (rejecting newspaper's 
claim of right of access to attorney at disciplinary records, and denying relevance of prior re-
straint precedents through the assertion that "this is not a case which calls into question the 
right of the press to print, publish and distribute information which it has already acquired"); 
McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 308 A.2d 888 (Pa. 1973) (rejecting newspaper's claim of right of ac-
cess to records of identity of welfare recipients under Article I, Section 7); see also id. at 895 
("[T]his is not a case involving the right of the press to print, publish and distribute informa-
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And although every legal sanction has some deterrent effect, not 
every statute announcing an ex ante prohibition on speech is a prior 
restraint. The "responsibility for abuse" contemplated by Article I, 
Section 7 clearly encompassed criminal as well as civilliability.72 
The two intermediate cases addressed by Pennsylvania's high 
court have involved the issuance of injunctions against communica-
tive activities which are said to violate applicable law and situations in 
which administrative officials exercise discretion over some but not 
all opportunities to engage in free communications. 
1. Injunctions 
Injunctions, unlike prior licensing schemes, generally restrain 
speech only after notice and hearing, and are usually subject to im-
mediate appeal. On the other hand, injunctions share with licensing 
schemes an orientation towards preventing rather than punishing al-
legedly illegal communications. Like a press license, injunctions turn 
on the determination of a single official; they can be granted with the 
stroke of a pen. Injunctions interfere with the dissemination of in-
formation on the basis of potentially exaggerated threats of possible 
future harm, rather than on the basis of the results of abuse proven 
before ajury. 
Historically, the record on judicially imposed ex ante restraints on 
free expression has been mixed in Pennsylvania. In the first years af-
ter the adoption of the 1790 constitution, it was not uncommon for 
courts to require authors and editors to post bonds or recognizances 
which were subject to forfeiture in the case of a published libel.73 
tion. If it were, the result we reach would be quite different. , , . Here, no impermissible prior 
restraint is involved."); In re Mack, 126 A.2d 679 (Pa. 1956) (upholding a court order barring 
photographing of criminal defendant against challenge under Article I, Section 7). 
l'2 \Vhile there are statements in Ins. Adjustment Bureau v. Ins. Comm'r, 542 A.2d 1317 (Pa. 
1988) that appear to characterize the statutory prohibition of solicitations by insurance adjust-
ers ·within 24 hours of an accident as "prior restraints," they are best understood as loose dicta. 
Such a characterization would be inconsistent with both the constitutional text, and prior re-
straint doctrine. The standard the court actually used in Insurance Adjustment Bureau falls con-
siderably short of the unyielding hostility to prior restraints that usually applies under Article I, 
Section 7. And the rule the case announces applies impartially to any restriction of commercial 
speech. See id. at 1324 ("Article I, Section 7 will not allow the prior restraint or other restriction of 
commercial speech . .. where the legitimate important interests of the government may be accom-
plished practicably in another, less intrusive manner.") (emphasis added). 
73 See Respublica v. Davis, 3 Yeates 128 (1801) (reporting a verdict against guarantor for vio-
lation of Gobbet's recognizance); Respublica v. Gobbet, 3 Yeates 93 (1800) (affirming the right 
of the Supreme Court to require recognizance against libel and the right of a jury to determine 
the law and facts in libel suits); id. at 99 (stating counsel's argument that "[t]o effect the pur-
poses of preventive justice, a discretion must necessarily be lodged with the magistrate" adduc-
ing right of President under the Alien Act to remove aliens); Respublica v. Gobbet, 2 Yeates 352 
(1798) (refusing removal to federal court of forfeiture action on recognizance bond imposed 
4ARTICl..ES.OCX: 11/20/02 12:49 PM 
32 JOURNAL OF CONSITT'f..;TIONAL LAW [Vol. 5:1 
This practice was said to be consistent with the constitutional prohibi-
tion on prior restraints on the ground that before forfeiture, a jury 
\vas required to find that a libel had occurred, and "a man though 
bound to his good behavior, may still publish what he pleases, and if 
he publishes nothing unlawful, his recognizance will not be for-
feited."74 The rule after 1806 was that surety could not be demanded 
for good behavior before comriction.75 
In the context oflabor struggles during the end of the nineteenth 
and the first half of the twentieth century, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court regularly upheld injunctions issued against parades, pickets, 
boycotts, and efforts to persuade employees to withdraw their labor. 
Many of these labor injunctions were phrased as prohibitions against 
particular modes of expression that were regarded as coercive.76 
These instances accord with the constitutional text. A prohibition 
against the assembly of a violent mob might well be seen as no in-
fringement of the proposition that "every citizen may freely speak, 
write or print on any subject." Mob violence is not "speaking writing 
or printing;" indeed, the protection of the right to assembly in Article 
I, Section 20 was specifically limited in 1790 to "the right in a peaceable 
manner to assemble together." So long as the injunction leaves open 
ample opportunity to exercise the constitutional right of "free com-
munication of thoughts and opinions" identified by Article I, Section 
7, it might well be viewed as no prior restraint. 
Other labor injunctions issued in the late nineteenth century and 
early twentieth, however, were directed not at the manner of speech 
but at its substance; the constitutionally protected "communication of 
thoughts and opinions" was enjoined because of its unlawful tenden-
by Justice McKean on publisher William Cobbett): Respublica v. Askew, I Yeates 186 (1792) 
(reporting a fine and security for good behavior for one year imposed in libel case). 
7




See Logan Valley Plaza v. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 950. 227 A.2d 874 
(Pa. 1967) (upholding an injunction against labor picketing in shopping mall); Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp. v. United Elec. Radio and Mach. Workers, I 18 A.2d 180 (Pa. 1955) (enjoining mass 
picketing that prevented access to plant); Wortex Mills Inc. v. Textile Workers, 85 A.2d 851 (Pa. 
1952) (reversing an injunction issued against mass picketing through a prohibition on "loiter· 
ing or being unnecessarily in the vicinity"); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United Elec. Radio 
Mach. Workers, 46 A.2d 16 (Pa. 1946) (issuing an injunction against forcible interference with 
access to struck plant); Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 45 A.2d 857, 861 
(Pa. 1946) (issuing an injunction against steelworkers forcibly interfering with maintenance 
employees entering struck plants stating that "(w]hen a 'picket line' becomes a picketfenceit is 
time for government to act"). C.f.Jefferson & Indiana Coal Co. v. Marks, 134 A. 430, 432-33 (Pa. 
1926) (issuing an injunction against parades and picketing where "it ·was a demonstration 
aimed at the fears rather than the judgment of those who desired to work . . . . [T]he very fact 
of parading at the time and place constituted intimidation and was properly enjoined .... Per-
suasion, too long and persistendy continued, becomes a nuisance and an unlawful form of co-
ercion"). 
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cies, an approach in substantial tension with the constitutional hostil-
• • • 77 Ity to pnor restramts. 
By the middle of the twentieth century, however, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court had announced the proposition that no equitable ju-
risdiction existed to enjoin the communications of organized labor in 
the absence of disorder, intimidation or threats.78 In the last fifty 
years, the issuance of injunctions against speech has withered. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court regularly invalidated the issu-
ance of injunctions proscribing exercises of free expression where the 
issuing courts failed to comply with the procedural mandates of no-
tice, hearing, and prompt final judicial determination imposed as a 
matter of First Amendment doctrine by the United States Supreme 
Court.79 As amended in 1973, in light of those cases, Pennsylvania 
Rule of Civil Procedure 1531 (f) (1) now provides: 
When a preliminary or special injunction involving freedom of expres-
sion is issued, either without notice or after notice and hearing, the court 
shall hold a final hearing within three (3) days after demand by the de-
fendant. A final decree shall be filed in the office of the prothonotary 
within twenty-four (24) hours after the close of the hearing. If the final 
hearing is not held within the three (3) day period, or if the final decree 
71 The early cases were the most extreme. See Kraemer Hosiery Co. v. Am. Fed'n of Full 
Fashioned Hosiery Workers, 157 A. 588 (Pa. 1931) (enjoining efforts to recruit employees who 
signed agreements not to join a union); Purvis v. Local 500, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 63 A. 
585 (Pa. 1906) (upholding issuance of an injunction against boycotting, encouraging a boycott 
and forbidding work on non-union material); Flaccus v. Smith, 48 A. 894, 895 (Pa. 1901) (issu-
ing an injunction against "seeking to induce the apprentices of the employer to violate the 
terms of their indentures" by joining a union); O'Neill v. Behanna, 37 A. 843 (Pa. 1897) (issu-
ing an injunction based on "annoyance, intimidation, ridicule and coercion" which extended to 
denial of the "right to talk to new men" on their way to work). But even after the heyday of the 
labor injunction, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court occasionally upheld the issuance of injunc-
tions against picketing for "unlawful" purposes. Grimaldi v. Local No. 9, 153 A.2d 214 (Pa. 
1959) (enjoining a union from picketing a one-man barbershop); Sansom House Enter. Inc. v. 
Waiters & Waitresses Union, Local 301, 115 A.2d 746 (Pa. 1955) (holding that the trial court 
should have issued injunction against picketing where object of picketing was to force employ-
ees to join a union); Baderak v. Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 112 A.2d 170 (Pa. 1955) 
(upholding an injunction against non-employees who stopped trucks making deliveries to a 
building site, convincing them not to fulfill their deliveries); Phillips v. United Bhd. of Carpen-
ters, 66 A2d 227 (Pa. 1949); Witbank v. Chester and Delaware Counties Bartenders, 60 A.2d 21 
(Pa. 1948) (issuing an injunction against picketing where "[d]efendants purpose in picketing 
was to require plaintiffs to force their employees to join the union ... Such a purpose is clearly 
unlawful .... "). 
78 Kirmse v. Adler, 166 A. 566 (Pa. 1933). 
19 See, e.g., Duggan v. 807 Liberty Ave., Inc., 288 A.2d 750 (Pa. 1972) (citing Freedman v. 
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965)); Commonwealth v. Guild Theatre, Inc., 248 A.2d 45 (Pa. 1968); 
see also Ranck v. Bona! Enterprises, Inc., 359 A.2d 748 (Pa. 1976) (condemning ex parte grant of 
a preliminary injunction against the exhibition or sale of allegedly obscene periodicals); Com-
monwealth ex rel. Davis v. Van Emberg, 347 A.2d 712 (Pa. 1975) (reversing an ex parte injunc-
tion closing a bookstore); Apple Storage Co., v. Consumers Educ. & Protective Assoc., 272 A.2d 
496 (Pa. 1971) (reversing grant of ex parte injunction against consumer picketing). 
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is not filed ·within twenty-four (24) hours after the close of the hearing, 
the injunction shall be deemed dissolved.
80 
These rules themselves suggest that viewed as a procedural matter, 
not all injunctions "involving freedom of expression" are impermissi-
ble.81 On the other hand, neither the cases enunciating the proce-
dural requirements nor the comments to Rule 1531 (f) make refer-
ence to the words and history of Article I, Section 7 or the holding of 
Dana that Pennsylvania's hostility to prior restraints is more severe 
than that of the Federal constitution. 
Willing v. Mazzocone82 provides the most recent discussion of the 
constraints of Article I, Section 7 on the issuance of injunctions, treat-
80 PA. R. CIV. P. 1531 (f) (I). In Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh v. Pittsburgh Fed'n of Teachers, 406 A.2d 
324 (Pa. 1979), the court held that since part of a preliminary injunction prohibiting a teachers' 
strike "prohibits certain communications by and between appellants and prohibits certain pick-
eting," the entire injunction was dissolved on refusal to grant a final hearing, although parts of 
the injunction "arguably did not involve freedom of expression." 
81 The current state of parallel federal law is set forth in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 
512 U.S. 753, 763 n.2 (1994); 
Prior restraints do often take the form of injunctions. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822, 91 S. Ct. 2140 (1971) (refusing to enjoin 
publications of the "Pentagon Papers"); Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 
308, 63 L. Ed. 2d 413, 100 S. Ct. 1156 (1980) (per curiam) (holding that Texas public nui-
sance statute which authorized state judges, on the basis of a showing that a theater had 
exhibited obscene films in the past, to enjoin its future exhibition of films not yet found 
to be obscene was unconstitutional as authori1Jng an invalid prior restraint). Not all in-
junctions that may incidentally affect expression, however, are "prior restraints" in the 
sense that that term was used in New York Times LAJ. or Vance. Here petitioners are not 
prevented from expressing their message in any one of several different ways; they are 
simply prohibited from expressing it within the 36-foot buffer zone. Moreover, the in-
junction was issued not because of the content of petitioners' expression, as was the case 
in New York Times Co. and Vance, but because of their prior unlawful conduct. (citations 
omitted). CJJustice O'Brien's dictum in CommonweaUh v. Guild Theatres, Inc., 248 A.2d 
45, 46 (Pa. 1968) (discussing First Amendment precedents, Justice O'Brien states that 
"[a]lthough we cannot agree with appellants contention that no prior restraint on the 
exhibition of a motion picture is permissible, it is clear that any such restraint must be 
very carefully circumscribed"). 
82 393 A.2d 1155 (Pa. 1978). Judge Mandarino's reliance on the strictures against prior re-
straints was joined by Justices Roberts and O'Brien, both concurring in the result. !d. at 1160 
(holding that Pennsylvania's constitutional protection of free expression is "based upon an air 
horrence of prior restraints"); id. (Pomeroy, J., concurring) (incorporating Justice Jacobs' dis-
senting opinion in the Superior Court, Mazzocone v. Willing, 369 A.2d 829, which was premised 
on the proposition that "Article I Section 7 ... was designed to ... prohibit the imposition of 
prior restraints"). See Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666 (3d Cir. 1991) (reviewing Pennsylva· 
nia cases and concluding that injunction against defamation is improper, even after a jury ver-
dict awarding damages); Terminix Int'l Co. 11. Kay, 150 F.R.D. 532 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (granting 
Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiffs counsel who sought an injunction against critical speech); 
Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 396 A.2d 1187, 1191 (Pa. 1979) (Roberts, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that statutory authorization of the Human Relations Commission to direct news-
paper to cease and desist publication of "situation wanted" advertisements identifying the adver-
tiser by sex, race, religion or age is an unconstitutional prior restraint under Article I, Section 
7); Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 327 A.2d 133, 138 (Pa. 1974) (Mandarino,]., concurring) (arguing 
that an injunction against contacting employers and family of credit card purchasers in effort to 
collect debt was an impermissible prior restraint). 
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ing injunctions as prior restraints. The prevailing opinion of Justice 
Mandarino relied on the prohibition of prior restraints in Article I, 
Section 7 to reverse an injunction entered against the picketing of a 
law firm by a disgruntled former client, despite a showing that the 
client's allegations were false and that her indigent status made her 
judgment proof in a defamation action. Since Willing, the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court has not upheld an injunction prohibiting an ex-
ercise of free expression in the face of a prior restraint challenge un-
der Article I, Section 7.85 
2. Permit Requirements 
It is not uncommon for municipal governments to require per-
mits for parades, demonstrations, or public meetings. While denial 
of such permits may not entirely foreclose the possibility of conveying 
the communications at issue, neither did denial of the classic press 
license prevent the dissemination of the information at issue by word 
of mouth. Article I, Section 20 declares that citizens have the right to 
peaceably assemble, and permit requirements, like the prior re-
straints against which Blackstone inveighed, place the opportunity to 
exercise unilateral discretion over the exercise of a constitutional 
right in the hands of the administrative officer who issues the permit. 
On the other hand, public meetings, and sometimes other forms of 
communication, carry with them the possibility of physical disruption 
"' In Giant Eagle Mkts. Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local Union No. 23, 652 
A.2d 1286 (Pa. 1995), the court sustained an injunction "ordering the pickets to be peaceful 
and lawful in nature, restricting the number of pickets at the entrances of all appellants' stores, 
mandating the proper spacing and location of those pickets, and enjoining appellees from pre-
venting persons having business with appellant from entering or leaving the premises" after a 
sho"'-ing of mass picketing, violence, and intimidation. !d. at 1291. The order in question did 
not prevent the communication of any thoughts or opinions, and the issue of prior restraint 
under Article I, Section 7 was not raised. 
During the last quarter century, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has three times explicitly 
declined to address Article I, Section 7 prior restraint issues: in Adler Barish, Daniels, Levin & 
Crescoff v. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175, 1179 (Pa. 1978), the court upheld an injunction against solici-
tation by a former employees of a law firm of the firm's clients, but engaged in no prior re-
straint analysis, observing that the employees "have not disputed the constitutionality of an in-
junction as a form of sanction." !d. at 1149 n.9. This seems a sensible approach. 
In Masiof! v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 613 A.2d ll86, 1187 (Pa. 1992), the court declined 
to address the propriety of a lower court order directing the participants in court-supervised 
labor negotiations not to make public statements without prior court authorization because 
"neither of the parties has asserted that the [court] has denied it authorization to make any 
public statements." ld. at 1187 n.l. This seems to be in some tension with the usual rule that 
the mere requirement of obtaining authorization is an impermissible prior restraint. 
Finally, in Bodack v. Law Enforcemenl Alliance of Am., 790 A.2d 277 (Pa. 2001), a majority of 
the Supreme Court without opinion declined to grant extraordinary jurisdiction to review an 
injunction entered against the airing of advertisements by political advocacy groups who had 
not complied with campaign disclosure laws. Justice Castille's dissent from the denial of juris-
diction argued, with some plausibility that the orders constituted impermissible prior restraints. 
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of traffic flow or other content-neutral interests which are not ade-
quately addressed by the possible assessment of damages. 
In an initial encounter with the issue in 1920, Duquesne City v. Fin-
ckef!A reviewed a conviction of labor organizers for holding a parade in 
violation of a local ordinance which forbade the holding of public 
meetings on city streets without a permit issued by the mayor. Not-
withstanding the fact that the organizers had filed three successive 
requests for permits upon which the mayor had taken no action,85 the 
court held that the conviction was consistent with the constraints of 
Pennsylvania's guarantees of free expression. The streets, according 
to the opinion, "are intended for passage and not assemblage" and 
"unless regulation is vested somewhere we may renew in our large cit-
ies the disorders which have recently appeared in those of the old 
world."86 A city, being the owner of the streets, was said to be entitled 
to regulate their use "under such restrictions and limitations, as in 
her opinion would best conserve 'the peace, good government, 
safety, and welfare of the city. "'87 If the mayor's refusal to act on the 
permit was unconstitutionally arbitrary or discriminatory, according 
to the court, a mandamus petition would provide the appropriate 
remedy. No mention was made of the constitutional strictures 
against prior restraints. 
Modem cases have been more skeptical of administrative licens-
ing. They have, in general, applied the federal free speech doctrine 
that a permit regime "which establishes a 'previous restraint' on free 
speech with no standards prescribed for the exercise of the discretion 
of the officer issuing the permit is invalid."88 Under Pennsylvania's 
&I ll2 A. 130 (Pa. 1920). 
85 Duquesne's Mayor Crawford is quoted as saying 'Jesus Christ himself could not speak in 
Duquesne on behalf of the A.F.L." JOHN P. HOERR, AND THE WOLF FINAlLY CAME 172 (1988); 
DA\10 BRODY, LABOR IN CRISIS; THE STEEL STRIKE OF 1919 94 (1965). See also INrERCHUROi 
WORlD MOVEMENr OF NORTII AMERICA, PUBIC OPINION AND 1HE STEEL STRIKE 188 (1921) 
(quoting Crawford as announcing "Jesus Christ himself could not hold a meeting in 
Duquesne"). Labor organizers were not favorites of local officials during this period in Penn· 
sylvania's history. See, e.g., Elizabeth Ricketts, The Struggle for Civil Liberties and Unionization in the 
Coal Fields: The Free Speech Case of Vintondak, Pennsylvania, 1922, 122 PA. MAG. OF HIST. AND 
BJOGRAPHY319 (1998). 
86 Duquesne City, I12 A. at 132-33. 
87 
I d. at I 34. 
88 Commonwealth ex rei. Hines v. Winfree, 182 A.2d 698, 702 (Pa. 1962) (quoting Saia v. 
New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948)) (upholding a truck ordinance which provided for automatic 
issuance of license on showing of technical compliance and payment of license fee). See also 
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150.151 (1969) (expounding "the many decisions 
of this Court over the last 30 years, holding that a law subjecting the exercise of First Amend· 
ment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite stan-
dards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional"). Cf Commonwealth v. Wadzinski, 
422 A.2d 124 (Pa. 1980) (invalidating a statute which required prior notification of an oppo-
nent before a candidate can make statements within last 48 hours of campaign by utilizing 
solely First Amendment analysis): Brush v. Pa. State l!niv., 414 A.2d 48 (Pa. 1980) (upholding a 
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independent free expression guarantees, the court in Commonwealth 
v. Tate held impermissible the exclusion of leafletters from a public 
forum on the basis of "a vague requirement of permission, governed 
by no articulated standards."89 
B. "Every Citizen May Freely Speak, Write and Print" 
1. The Scope of the Protected Conduct: 
"Free Communication of Thoughts and Opinions" 
Pennsylvania's free expression protections are broadly phrased. 
Although particular modes of communication are mentioned-"the 
printing presses" in Article I, Section 7[a], "speech printing and writ-
ing" in Article I, Section 7[b], the "publication of papers" in Article I, 
Section [c), and "assembly" and "petition address or remonstrance" 
in Article I, Section 20-the underlying protection is accorded to the 
right of citizens to "free communication of thoughts and opinions." 
A citizen need use no particular means of communication to in-
voke her right to free expression. Pennsylvania's courts have recog-
nized that constitutional protection extends to dis~lay of the flag as a 
decoration within the privacy of a citizen's home, as wel1 as to erec-
college rule that allowed canvassing in dormitories only if majority of residents voted to allow 
canvassing where Article I, Section 7 was raised, but citing only federal cases in response); 
Commonwealth v. Sterlace, 391 A.2d 1066 (Pa. 1978) (upholding a prohibition on the placing 
of advertising materials such a flyers on residential property without prior consent of the resi-
dent using entirely federal analysis). 
89 Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382, 1390-91 (Pa. 1981). Seeid. at 1391 ("[T]he college 
could not, consistent with the invaluable rights to freedom of speech, assembly, and petition 
constitutionally guaranteed by this Commonwealth to its citizens exercise its right of property to 
invoke a standardless permit requirement ... to prevent appellants from peacefully presenting 
their point of view."). The analysis in Tate applied Article I, Sections 7 and 20 to the exercise of 
authority by a private college, and there is some debate as to the vitality of its holding in that 
regard. Sl!'ll infra text accompanying notes 119-131. For public actors, however, Tate seems 
clearly to preclude the exercise of "standardless" discretion in the administration of a public 
forum. See Tate, 432 A.2d at 1391 n.l4 ("Nor may they be based simply upon an undifferenti-
ated fear or apprehension of disturbance .... ) (citation omitted). 
90 See Commonwealth v. Bricker, 666 A.2d 257, 261 (Pa. 1995): 
Clearly, there is no precise constitutional calculus as to what constitutes constitutionally 
protected expression. However, we believe that the government must satisfy constitu-
tional scrutiny before it can tell the citizens of this Commonwealth what pictures they 
may hang on their walls or what symbols they may display in the sanctity of their homes. 
We recognize that Ms. Bricker's display of the flag is not "high art" such as a display of 
decorative arts found in a fine art museum. However, we believe that the Constitution 
applies to "low art" as well as "high art." 
Bricker undertakes analysis primarily in First Amendment terms, but the conclusion regard-
ing the protected nature of home decoration is grounded on an exposition of Pennsylvania's 
constitutional right to privacy in the home. 
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tion of a liberty pole in the public square.91 The effort to peacefull~ 
persuade employees to withdraw from employment or join a union, 2 
to picket the premises of employers involved in a labor dispute,93 to 
picket landlords accused of disreputable practices,94 to seek to per-
suade others to join a boycott for legitimate purposes,95 to distribute 
or sell printed materials on a public street (though not to establish a 
stationary newsstand) 96 have all been regarded as protected exercises 
of the rights of free expression under the Pennsylvania constitution.97 
Likewise, the right to free communication of thoughts and opinions 
is infringed by a compulsion to engage in undesired communica-
• 98 t10n. 
Although the Pennsylvania Court formerly excluded commercial 
speech from the protected "communication of thoughts and opin-
91 
Respublica v. Montgomery, I Yeates 419, 422 (1795) (rejecting the claim that erection of a 
liberty pole was an exercise of the right to "free communication of thoughts and opinions" be-
cause it constituted an "abuse of that liberty" "when the army were known to have been on the 
march in support of the constitution and law could only be attributed to an avowed design of 
giving aid to the insurgents"); cj Pennsylvania v. Morrison, I Add. 274 (1795) (prosecuting for a 
liberty pole "in defiance of the laws of the state of Pennsylvania"). 
Liberty poles originated as large wooden columns often fashioned out ships masts erected in 
public squares as part of the rites of resistance to British authority during the American revolu-
tion. SIMON P. NE\'lMAN, PARADES AND THE POliTICS OF THE STREET 25-29 (1997). After the 
revolution, they were used as symbols of resistance during the Whiskey Rebellion, id. at 172-73, 
and adopted by Jeffersonian republicans as prominent and easily recognizable symbols of lib-
erty, equality and republicanism, and as symbols of opposition to the Federalists government, as 
well as to the Sedition Act. ld. at80-81, 97, 170-79. 
92 Kirmse v. Adler, 166 A. 566 (Pa. 1933); Kraemer Hosiery Co. v. Am. Fed'n of Full Fash-
ioned Hosiery Workers, 157 A. 588 (Pa. 1931 ). 
93 Locust Club v. Hotel & Club Employees' Union, 155 A.2d 27 (Pa. 1959); Warren v. Mo-
tion Picture Mach. Operators, liS A.2d 168 (Pa. 1955); American Brake Shoe Co. v. District 
Lodge 9 of the Int'l A..~s'n of Machinists, 94 A.2d 884 (Pa. 1953); Wortex Mills Inc. v. Textile 
Workers Union, 85 A.2d 851 (Pa. 1952); Alliance Auto Serv. Inc. v. Cohen, 19 A.2d 152 (Pa. 
1941). 
91 Hibbs v. Neighborhood Org. to Rejuvenate Tenant Housing, 252 A.2d 622 (Pa. 1969). 
95 1621 Inc. v. Wilson, 166 A.2d 271 (Pa. 1960) (neighborhood organization picketing local 
taproom viewed as nuisance); Watch Tower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Dougherty, 11 A.2d 147 (Pa. 
1940) (Catholic threat to boycott department store whose radio station broadcast anti-Catholic 
programming). 
96 46 S. 52nd St. Corp. v. Manlin, 157 A.2d 381 (Pa. 1960). 
97 The Court's conclusions that "fighting words" are outside of free speech protections have 
used First Amendment analysis exclusively. Compare Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, 414 A.2d 
54 (Pa. 1980) (upholding a conviction for disorderly conduct, defined as "making unreasonable 
noise "~th intent to annoy or alarm," where defendant followed and frightened a meter maid, 
calling her "nigger lover" and "cocksucker") with Commonwealth v. Hock, 728 A.2d 943 (Pa. 
1999) (addressing the words "[f]*** you, a**" [sic] to a police officer did not constitute disor-
derly conduct). Cf Commonwealth v. Hendrickson, 724 A.2d 315 (Pa. 1999) (upholding a 
"harassment by communication" statute requiring specific intent to harass by repeated commu-
nications against first amendment challenge-Article I, Section 7 challenge waived because not 
raised below). 
98 Dudek v. Pittsburgh City Fire Fighters, 228 A.2d 752 (Pa. 1967). 
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ions,"99 the current rule considers commercial speech to be within the 
sphere of constitutional safeguards when it is neither false nor mis-
1 d . 100 ea mg. 
2. The Scope of Prohibited Interference 
Article I, Section 7[a] announces that the freedom of the press is 
protected against "laws ... made to restrain the right thereof."101 Ar-
ticle I, Section 7[c] places constraints on "prosecutions" and "indict-
ments" for publications of papers. It is clear, therefore, that official 
actions which impose criminal punishment for the exercise of rights 
of free expression are subject to the limits imposed by the Pennsylva-
nia constitution. 
But the potential for interference with free expression extends 
beyond the threat of criminal prosecution and Article I, Section 7[b] 
and Article I, Section 20 are phrased in broader terms. They an-
nounce that "every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any 
subject" and that "citizens have the right" to freedom of assembly, pe-
tition or remonstrance. Under these provisions, actions other than 
criminal prosecution may constitute derogations of the right to 
"freely speak, write, or print" and the right to freedom of assembly, 
petition, and remonstrance that call forth scrutiny under the Penn-
I 
. . . 102 sy vama constitutiOn. 
a. Civil Sanctions 
Although the protections of Article I, Section 7[c] are limited by 
their terms to "indictments" or "prosecutions," it has long been clear 
99 Ullom v. Boehm, 142 A.2d 19 (Pa. 1958) (holding that a prohibition of price advertising 
by sellers of eyeglasses does not violate Article I, Section 7, but rather, is a valid exercise of the 
state's police power). 
100 See Bureau of Profl & Occupational Affairs v. State Bd. of Physical Therapy, 728 A.2d 340, 
343 (Pa. 1999) ("Insofar as false or misleading commercial speech is concerned, we have fol-
lowed the federal view that such speech as not constitutionally protected."); Ins. Adjustment 
Bureau v. Ins. Comm"r for Pennsylvania, 542 A.2d 1317 (Pa. 1988) (invalidating a statute pro-
hibiting solicitation of business by claims adjusters during first twenty-four hours of a catastro-
phe); id. at 1324 ("Our perspective is that in the commercial speech area, we should tread care-
fully where restraints are imposed on speech if there are less intrusive, practicable methods 
available to effect legitimate, important government interests."); Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh 
Press Co., 483 Pa. 314, 396 (1979) (holding that an order forbidding newspapers from printing 
requests for employment identifying their sex, race, age, and religion of the advertiser was un-
constitutional on the ground that there was no sho"''ing the limitation was "necessary to pro-
mote ... legitimate state interest[s]" and further, holding that "unsubstantiated belief' was in-
sufficient). 
,., PA. CoNsr. an. I,§ 7[a) (2001). 
'"' !d. art. I, § 7[b); id. art. I, § 20. 
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that civil sanctions levied by state courts are also constrained by the 
general guaranties of Article I, Sections 7[a] and 7[b] .103 
b. Deprivation of Licenses and Government Employment 
Under the constitution of 1790, the Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia determined that despite the fact that attorneys are admitted to 
the bar on good behavior, the disbarment of an attorney for publica-
tion of measured criticism of a sitting judge would be an impermissi-
ble limitation of free expression.104 Similarly, in construing the con-
stitution of 1874, Pennsylvania's Supreme Court treated disbarment 
as a punishment that would deprive an attorney of "his profession 
and livelihood," holding that 
[i]t would be a clear infraction of the spirit if not the letter of [the free 
speech protections] to hold that an attorney can be summarily disbarred 
for the publication of a libel on a man in a public capacity or where the 
matter ¥.as proper for public investigation or information ... he certainly 
does not forfeit his constitutional rights as a freeman by becoming an at-
!05 
tomey. 
In the case of public employment, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court was initially less willing to recognize denial of employment as a 
"deprivation of livelihood" that impinged on constitutional rights to 
free expression. During the first half of the twentieth century the 
court regularly held that discharge from public employment because 
of particular expressions of political sentiment did not interfere un-
constitutionally '\\rith the right to "free communication of thoughts 
Jtl3 See Briggs v. Garrett, 2 A. 513 (Pa. 1886) (observing tension between liberty of press and 
protection of reputation in a libel action presenting the constitutional question of whether de-
fendant "abused the right" of free speech); Runkle v. Meyer, 3 Yeates 518 (1803) (justifying a 
civil action for libel against printer under Article I, Section 9 as an imposition of "responsibility" 
for "abuse of liberty"). Cf Boettger v. Loverro, 587 A.2d 712, 720.21 {Pa. 1991) (construing a 
state statute to avoid imposition of liability for publication of wiretap transcripts lawfully ob-
tained). 
'"' In reAustin, 5 Rawle 191,205-06 (1835} (stating an attorney is "not professionally answer-
able for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal 
animadversion as a citizen"). 
105 Ex parte Steinman, 95 Pa. 220, 238-39 ( 1880) (reversing a disbarment for criticism of a 
judge). Compare Margolis' Case, 112 A. 478,480 (Pa. 1921) (upholding disbarment where in 
addition to anarchist affiliations, attorney "encouraged others, by his addresses, to violate the 
laws of the land"); id. ("Such conduct ... in the case of an attorney, whose duty it is to uphold 
the law, and not encourage a breach thereof it constitutes a positive disregard of the official 
obligation which he solemnly entered into when he took his oath of office.") (citation omitted) 
with Schlesinger Appeal, 172 A.2d 835, 842 (Pa. 1961) (relying on federal precedents, reversing 
disbarment of a member of the communist party, because "[c]ulpability does not attach merely 
from membership in the Communist Party ... under our traditions beliefs are personal and not 
a matter of mere association") (citation omitted). See also Schlesinger v. Musmanno, 81 A.2d 
316 (Pa. 1951) (reversing on due process grounds summary disbarment by a trial judge who 
concluded the attorney was a communist). 
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and ideas" because no constitutional provision guaranteed public 
employment. Objections were dismissed on the ground that "[i]f 
such restriction is distasteful to [an employee], he has the alternative 
of seeking other employment." 106 So, too, the Pennsylvania Court 
concluded that conditions on the grant of licenses could not infringe 
on guarantees of free expression because there was no right to obtain 
such licenses. 107 
In the aftermath of the McCarthy era, however, the Pennsylvania 
Court began to recognize the scope of the potential impact of denials 
of "privileges" on opportunities for free expression. 11 In 1971 the 
court sustained a challenge under both federal and state free speech 
protections to the dismissal of a public employee for statements criti-
cal of government welfare policy. It announced that in light of 
the tremendous increase in government activity and emplo}ment ... it is 
today a well established principle that constitutional rights are no longer 
forfeited simply because one is a policeman, or a lawyer, or a teacher, or 
even a lifeguard. These public occupations "are not relegated to a wa-
tered-down version of constitutional rights" . . . . "It is too late in the day 
to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infrin~ed by 
the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege."1 
106 Duffy v. Cooke, 86 A. 1076, 1081 (Pa. 1913) (upholding statute discharging municipal 
employees who sen>e as members of or attend meeting of any political party). See Bd. of Pub. 
Educ. v. August, 177 A.2d 809 (Pa. 1962) (upholding discharge of teacher for refusal to answer 
questions about communist affiliations); Bd. of Educ. v. Soler, 176 A.2d 653 (Pa. 1961) (same); 
Bd. of Pub. Educ. v. Beilan, 125 A.2d 327 (Pa. 1956) (same); Fitzgerald v. Philadelphia, 102 
A.2d 887 (Pa. 1954) (upholding loyalty oath required of hospital nurse); Albert Appeal, 92 A.2d 
663 (Pa. 1952) (upholding discharge of high school English teacher for "advocation of or par-
ticipating in un-American or subversive doctrines"); McCrory v. Philadelphia, 27 A.2d 55 (Pa. 
1942) (upholding dismissal of fire fighter because he wore a political badge and solicited votes); 
Hutchinson v. !\fagee, 122 A. 234 (Pa. 1923) (upholding order barring members of fireman's 
association from employment in fire department). 
107 
In re Tahiti Bar, lnc .. 150 A.2d 112, ll4 (Pa. 1959) (upholding suspension of liquor li-
censes suspended for "lewd, immoral and/ or improper entertainment"); see also id. at 116: 
An individual has no constitutional right to engage in the business of selling alcoholic 
beverages.. . . [The statute] merely provides that, if a certain type of entertainment is 
presented, the privilege of dispensing alcoholic beverages, to which an individual has no 
constitutional right, will be withdrawn ... the right of the individual to freedom of 
:peech is not involved. 
1 See Bd. of Pub. Educ. v. Watson, 163 A.2d 60 (Pa. 1960) (reversing dismissal of teacher 
dismissed for failing to answer HUAC questions on First Amendment grounds); Ault v. Unem-
ployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 157 A.2d 375, 378 (Pa. 1960) (reversing denial of unemploy-
ment compensation to claimant discharged from private employment for invoking Fifth 
Amendment before U.S. Senate investigating committee, and noting the tendency to "be-
come[s] myopic upon the mere mention of Communism"). This recognition had been fore-
shadowed in Wilmerding Borough Sch. Dist. Bd. of Dir. v. Gillies, 23 A.2d 447, 448 (Pa. 1942) 
(reversing dismissal of teacher who was alleged to have "chosen as his companions and associ-
ates, communists and persons of radical political belief," because evidence did not meet statu· 
to?,' standard for dismissal on the basis of immorality or incompetence). 
09 
In re Chalk, 272 A.2d 457, 459-60 (Pa. 1971) (citations omitted). See also Redevelopment 
Auth. of Philadelphia v. Ueberman, 336 A.2d 249 (Pa. 1975) (reversing dismissal of employee 
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c. Private Interference with Free Expression 
Unlike the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal con-
stitution, which are by their terms directed respectively against ac-
tions by "Congress" and "states," the words of Pennsylvania's free ex-
pression guaranties do not confine their protection to particular 
modes of "state action." Article I, Section 7[b] announces, as its 
predecessors have since 1790, that " [ t] he free communication of 
thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and 
every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being 
responsible for abuse of that liberty. ,Hn Article I, Section 20 declares, 
in similar fashion, that "[t]he citizens have a right" to assembly, peti-
tion and remonstrance. 111 The constitutional text gives no reason to 
believe that private and public assaults may not equally violate these 
rights. 
To be sure, the concluding paragraph of the Declaration of Rights 
has provided since 1790 that "everything in this article is excepted 
out of the general powers of government and shall forever remain in-
vi.olate."112 But the limitation of the "powers of government" does not 
exhaust the effect of the Declaration of Rights. In Spayd v. Ringing 
Rock Lodge, 113 the court gave weight to the separate constitutional ad-
monition that the rights of the Declaration should "forever remain 
inviolate" to preclude retaliation by a labor union against one of its 
members. Moreover, the Declaration's wording since 1790 has been 
introduced by an intent that the "essential principles of liberty and 
free government may be recognized and unalterably established." 114 
By the terms of the constitution, the "invaluable right" of "free 
communication of thoughts and opinions" is one such "principle of 
liberty and free government." To take the extreme case, a polity in 
which one political group is at liberty to suppress its competitors by 
who had publicly criticized employer; relying on federal First Amendment precedents); Com-
monwealth ex rei. Specter v. Moak, 307 A.2d 884 (Pa. 1973) (stating "it is now beyond cavil that 
public employees may not be denied constitutional rights on the theory that public employ· 
ment is a privilege, not a right," but holding under First Amendment precedents that prohibi· 
tion on political candidacy is a constitutionally permissible restriction on the political activity of 
municipal employees). 
In Pennsylvania State Police v. Hospitality lnv. of Philadelphia, Inc., 650 A.2d 854 (Pa. 1994), a 
majority of the court relied on Tahiti Bar to hold that liquor licensees waived their free speech 
objections to prohibitions on price advertising. The case was reversed and remanded for recon· 
sideration by the U.S. Supreme Court, 517 U.S. 1206 (1996) and on remand, the statute was 
struck down on First Amendment grounds without addressing Article I, Section 7. Pennsylvania 
State Police v. Hospitality Inv. of Philadelphia, Inc., 689 A.2d 213 (Pa. 1997). 
110 P A. CONSf. art. I, § 7[b] (200 l). 
Ill fd. art. (, § 20. 
112 Id. art. I, § 25. 
"' II3 A. 70, 72 (Pa. 1921). 
114 PA. CONSf. art. I, Introduction (2001). 
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private force would be characterized by neither "liberty" nor "free 
government," even if the form of elections remained. Given the im-
portance of free speech in underpinning Pennsylvania's democratic 
self governance, its constitution cannot be indifferent to private at-
tempts to stifle political expression. 
A line of twentieth century cases confirms this perception. In 
Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
viewed a petition from a member of the Brotherhood of Railroad 
Trainmen who had been expelled for signing a petition asking the 
Pennsylvania legislature to reconsider a "full crew law" supported by 
the union. The court issued an injunction grounded on the free ex-
pression provisions of the Pennsylvania constitution, compelling the 
plaintiff's reinstatement. It declared: 
When plaintiff signed the petition to the legislature to repeal the Full 
Crew Law, he was communicating his "thoughts and opinions" to that 
body, and seeking at its hands redress of what he considered a public 
"grievance"-relief which the lawmakers alone could grant. Since plain-
tiff viewed the statute petitioned against as such a grievance, the course 
of conduct pursued by him was not merely within his legal rights, but ac-
corded with his solemn duty as a citizen, for the exercise of which he can 
d . be al' d 115 un er no ctrcumstances pen tze . 
The court adduced as well a narrower ground for decision: 
We have often said that the by-laws, rules and regulations of these artifi-
cial bodies will be enforced only when they are reasonable . . . . and they 
never can be adjudged reasonable when, as here, they would compel the 
citizen to lose his property rights in accumulated assets, or forego the ex-
ercise of other rights 'Mlich are constitutionally inviolable. 116 
Similarly, in Dudek v. Pittsburgh City Fire Fighters, Local No. 1,117 the 
court, relying on Spayd, enjoined the imposition of fines by a public 
employees union on eighteen members who refused to picket Demo-
cratic ward meetings as the union directed. The court reasoned: 
It is just as illegal to compel one to speak when he prefers to remain si-
lent as it is to gag one when he wishes to talk .... [T]he regulations and 
by-laws of organizations such as the one under consideration, will be en-
forced only when they are reasonable . . . . [P]laintiffs would be com-
pelled to oppose by signs, and by picketing, candidates for whom they 
might well have a decided preference. Such a regulation imposes a blan-
ket opposition which is so contrary to the fundamental rules of fairness 
m Spayd, 113 A. at 72. See also id. ("The rights above noted cannot lawfully be infringed, even 
momentarily, by individuals any more than by the State itself."); id.: 
The Constitution does not confer the right, but guarantees its free exercise-without let 
or hindrance from those in authority, at all times, under any and all circumstances; and, 
when this is kept in view, it is apparent that such a prerogative can neither be denied by 
others nor surrendered by the citizen himself. 
n• Id. 
117 228 A.2d 752 (Pa. 1967). 
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that it cannot possibly pass muster under the criterion of reasonable-us ness. 
Commonwealth v. Tate119 reversed the defiant trespass conviction of 
demonstrators who sought to peacefully disuibute leaflets on a pri-
vate college campus opposing the policies of the FBI director who 
had been invited to a public meeting on campus. The court began by 
reviewing the wording and heritage of Pennsylvania's constitutional 
guarantees of free speech, concluding that "the rights of freedom of 
speech, assembly, and petition have been guaranteed since the first 
Pennsylvania Constitution, not simply as restrictions on the powers of 
government, as found in the Federal Constitution, but as inherent 
and 'invaluable' rights of man."12° Construing the Pennsylvania stat-
ute's affirmative defense to prosecution for defiant trespass when 
property is "open to members of the public" and an alleged tres-
passer has complied with all "lawful conditions" for access, the court 
concluded that the prohibition of defendants' leafletting was not a 
"lawful" condition: 
[T]he college could not, consistent with the invaluable rights to freedom 
of speech, assembly, and petition constitutionally guaranteed by this 
Commonwealth to its citizens, exercise its right of property to invoke a 
standardless permit requirement and the state's defiant trespass law to 
prevent appellants from peacefully presenting their point of view to this 
indisputabl~ relevant audience in an area of the college normally open to 
the public. 1 1 
Some federal courts have viewed the Supreme Court's subsequent 
decision in Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers v. Connecticut General 
Life Insurance Co. 122 as a repudiation of the Spayd-Dudek-Tate line of 
llS !d. at 755-56. See also id. at 757 (Cohen,]., concurring in the result) ("The legality of the 
objective sought by the union did not overcome its unlawful attempt at coerced expression by 
individual union members contrary to their constitutional rights of free speech and political 
belief."); id. at 758 (Roberts,]., concurring) ("It should be noted that the language of our Con-
stitution prohibits not only state interference with free expression but also coercion of speech 
from sources other than the state."). See also Collins v. Main Line Bd. of Realtors, 304 A.2d 493 
(Pa. 1973) (enjoining exclusion of real estate broker from trade organization as common law 
restraint of trade). 
One of the reasons, for example, given by the appellee corporation for denying mem-
bership to the appellants centered around charges brought by appellants on behalf of a 
client against the appellee, charging it with discrimination before the Pennsylvania State 
Human Relations Commission. Although the charge was dismissed by the Commission, 
the Board felt that Collins had maligned its reputation by bringing the charge. We think 
it sufficient to say that Collins and Suburban should not now be permitted to be penal-
ized for assisting a client in an attempt to assert his constitutional right to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances. 
ld. at 497-98. 
119 432 A.2d !382 (Pa. 1981). 
120 
!d. at 1388. 
121 
ld. at 1391. 
122 515A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1986). 
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cases, and therefore as a rejection of the possibility that private ac-
tions can constitute an unconstitutional interference with Pennsylva-
nia free expression rights. 123 Socialist Workers refused to enjoin the 
owner of a shopping center from enforcing a policy uniformly ban-
ning all political leafletting, but to view it as overruling the prior con-
struction of Pennsylvania's free expression guarantees misreads the 
five opinions delivered by the fractured court in the case.124 
The concurring opinions of Justices Larsen and McDermott ex-
plicitly rejected Tate, and Justice Zappala expressed "serious doubts'' 
regarding its conclusions.125 Justice Nix, however, explicitly reaf-
firmed Tate and joined in what he regarded as the lead opinion's 
conclusion that "the limitation in federal constitutional decisions to 
matters involving 'state action' is not applicable in an analysis where 
it is alleged that one of these rights conferred under our constitution 
has been violated."126 The lead opinion by Justice Hutchinson, joined 
by Justice Flaherty, offered a very narrow analysis in support of its 
conclusion that "the Pennsylvania Constitution does not guarantee 
access to private property for the exercise of such rights where, as 
here, the owner uniformly and effectively prohibits all political activi-
ties and similarly precludes the use of its groperty as a forum for dis-
cussion of matters of public controversy."1 
On one hand, the lead opinion affirms that the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution "is a limitation on the power of state government ... [that] 
prohibits the government from interfering with [inherent natural 
rights] and leaves adjustment of the inevitable conflicts among them 
to private interaction, so long as that interaction is peaceable and 
non-violent." 128 On the other hand, the opinion immediately cau-
·~ See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Constitu-
tional Def. Fund v. Humphrey, No. 92-396, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9306 (E. D. Pa. July 1, 1992); 
Tinneny v. Frasse-Basset, Inc., No. 85-547, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6152 (E.D. Pa. May 21, 1990); 
cf. Sabatini v. Reinstein, No. 99-2393, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12820 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 1999) 
{holding that no private cause of action existed under Article I, Section 7). 
124 See, e.g., Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391 {3d Cir. 1989) (same); Cable Inv., Inc. v. Woolley, 
867 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1989) {same); Cyber Promotions v. America Online, 948 F. Supp. 436 
{E. D. Pa. 1996) (treating Western Pennsylvania Socialists as clarifYing Tate; crucial question was 
whether defendant established a public forum); Coatesville Dev. Co. v. United Food & Com-
mercial Workers, 542 A.2d 1380 {Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) {reversing grant of injunction against 
picketing on private property, and declining to reach Article I, Section 7). 
125 
W. Pennsylvania Socialist Workm, 515 A.2d 1331, 1340 {Larsen, J., concurring); id. at 1340 
(Za~pala,J., concurring); id. at 1341 (McDermott,]., concurring in the result). 
1 ld. at 1341 (Nix,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
127 ld. at 1333 (distinguishing the one-sided college policy in Tate which allowed speech by 
the FBI director, but banned that of his critics). 
128 ld. at 1335. The opinion fails to note that the key language regarding the "free communi-
cation of ideas and opinions" was adopted in the 1790 constitution rather than the natural 
rights constitution of 1776, ignoring the clear salience to the framers of the political function of 
the rights of free communication {see Declaration of Rights, supra note 7), and overlooking the 
insertion by the 1790 convention of the clarification that the Declaration of Rights is promul-
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tions, "[w]e are not suggesting that the rights enumerated in the Dec-
laration of Rights exist only against the state;" "[t]hey are not created 
by the constitution, but presetved by it," citing Spayd. 129 It concludes 
that shopping malls are not "require[d] ... to provide a political fo-
rum for persons or groups with views on public issues, so long as the 
owner does not grant unfair advantage to particular interests or 
groups by making his premises arbitrarily available to those he favors 
while excluding all others," citing Commonwealth v. Tate. 130 Thus, the 
opinion apparently reaffirms both Tate and Spayd without mentioning 
Dudek. 
The current state of doctrine is hardly pellucid. None of the 
Pennsylvania cases go so far as to declare that every action by a private 
party which deters the exercise of free expression is a violation of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution. But the constitutional commitment to 
free expression clearly exercises a "gravitational" pull in interpreting 
both statutory and common law requirements. Where either statu-
tory or common law doctrines constrain the exercise of a legal right 
or privilege to "reasonable" dimensions, this line of cases at a mini-
mum mandates that a "reasonable" application of those rights or 
privileges cannot be one that derogates Pennsylvania's constitutional 
. f . 131 commttment to ree expresston. 
gated in order that "essential principles of liberty and free government may be recognized and 
unalterably established." 
129 
Id. at 1335. 
1110 I d. at 1336. See also id. at 1338 (affirming that Tate "implicitly recognized" Pennsylvania's 
constitution provides greater protection than the federal constitution). 
1~ 1 These cases also suggest that Judge Adams was on solid ground in Novoselv. Nationwide Ins. 
Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983), in holding that the Pennsylvania free expression guarantees 
provide a basis for concluding that public policy prohibits the discharge of a private employee 
for refusing to sign letters to legislators in support of his employer's political agenda. The pos-
sibility of a wrongful discharge action based on the Declaration of Rights has occasioned a long· 
running debate as Pennsylvania's law has evolved over the last twenty years. See James G. Fan-
non, The Public Policy Exception to the Emplaymmt at Will Doctrine: Searching for Clear Mandates in the 
Pennsylvania Constitution, 27 RliTGERS L.J. 927 (1996). The most recent opinions from the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court suggest that an employer's efforts to interfere with an employee's 
activities as a citizen, exercising her constitutional right to participate in political discourse or 
petition or demonstrate, would be actionable. See Shick v. Shirey, 716 A.2d 1231 (Pa. 1998) 
(discharge in retaliation for filing worker's compensation claim was actionable); see also Shick v. 
Shirey, 691 A.2d 511, 518 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), rev'd, 716 A.2d 1231 (Pa. 1998) (Saylor,J., dis-
senting) (wrongful discharge action is available on the basis of "a violation of a clearly man· 
dated public policy which 'strikes at the heart of a citizen's social right, duties, and responsibili· 
ties'") (quoting Novosel). Cf McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 750 A.2d 283, 289 
(Pa. 2000) (rejecting wrongful discharge claim based on a possible violation of a federal statute 
distinguishing case where "if we allowed an employer to discharge an employee for filing a 
complaint with a Commonwealth agency such as the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, we 
impact the rights of that employee and the public by undermining the very purposes of a statute 
of this Commonwealth"). 
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d. Other Regulations 
In the usual case, the free communication of thoughts and opin-
ions is not infringed by generally applicable regulations simply be-
cause they impose some collateral burden on communication. Thus, 
the elimination of a sales tax exemption for magazines, while the tax 
was retained for newspapers, was held to be consistent with Article I, 
Section 7 because the tax was identical to that imposed on other 
items of commerce and incidence of the tax was based on format and 
frequency of the publication rather than its contents. 132 
In Philadelphia Fraternal Order of Correctional Officers v. Rendell, the 
court held that a statute which limited collective bargaining rights of 
public employees to a single designated union even when a rival un-
ion had been chosen by employees did not impinge on rights guaran-
teed by Pennsylvania's free expression protections. The Court rea-
soned: "Appellants have not been prohibited from forming PFOCO 
nor have they suffered any retaliation from the City or the Common-
wealth for forming a rival union and expressing dissatisfaction with 
AFSCME ... freedom of speech does not include the right to force 
another to listen .... "133 
On the other hand, while an order denying access to government 
information is not a prior restraint, interferences with the opportu-
nity to gather news are subject to review under the Pennsylvania 
Court's free expression jurisprudence, to guard against gratuitous 
government interference with the flow of information to the public. 134 
132 See Magazine Publishers of Am. v. Commonwealth, 654 A.2d 519 (Pa. 1995). So, too, the 
Pennsylvania constitution does not protect the press from the general obligation to comply with 
grand jury subpoenas. In reTaylor, 193 A.2d 181. 184 (Pa. 1963) ("(B]y no stretch of language 
can it protect or include under 'freedom of the press' the non-disclosure of sources of informa-
tion ... ."). See also Commonwealth v, Abu:Jamal, 555 A.2d 846, 859 (Pa. 1989) ("Punishing a 
person for expressing his views or for associating with certain people is substantially different 
from allowing his statements to be used for impeachment or to be considered as evidence of his 
character where that character is a relevant inquiry."). 
133 Philadelphia Fraternal Order of Correctional Officers v. Rendell, 736 A.2d 573, 577 (Pa. 
1999). 
131 See, e.g., McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 308 A.2d 888, 896-97 (Pa. 1973): 
[It] is perhaps logical to assume that ... a right to gather news "of some dimension must 
exist" if the First Amendment is to have realistic vitality ... we agree that such a right, 
emanating from the First Amendment, does exist, this right, as all other First Amend-
ment rights, is not absolute .... Here appellees have no right to compel the disclosure 
of names explicitly restricted by statute .... The Commonwealth's interest in protecting 
the privacy of those it aids through public assistance is paramount and compelling ... 
The statutory limitation imposed on appellees' asserted First Amendment right to com-
pel the disclosure ... is no greater than necessary to protect the substantial governmen-
tal and individual interests involved. 
See also In re McLaughlin, 348 A.2d 376, 382 (Pa. 1975) ("We need not here intimate any view as 
to whether such a right of access exists in this case, for even assuming [it does] ... we would 
conclude that the right is overborne by the paramount interest of the state in protecting the 
grant of confidentiality."); In re Mack, 126 A.2d 679, 681 (Pa. 1956) (upholding an order pro-
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3. "Responsible for Abuse" 
The protections offered by Pennsylvania's free speech provisions 
are qualified. The core constitutional text contemplates the possibil-
ity of sanctions for "abuse" of constitutional liberties, and the prime 
interpretative challenge is to identifY the substance of these "abuses." 
The clearest constitutional provision, the substantive and proce-
dural protections against criminal prosecution for publications in-
volving public officials or issues provided by Article I, Section 7[c], 
has been largely superceded bJ more protective federal constitutional 
standards in the area of libel. 1 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
taken the position that in light of the constitutional protection for 
personal reputation provided by Article I, Section 1 of the Declara-
tion of Rights, federal rules establish the outer limits of constitutional 
protection against defamation actions. The Court wrote: "[t]o gratui-
tously embellish upon the stringent requirements of current federal 
constitutional law [regarding libel] ... would be in conflict with the 
hibiting taking pictures of criminal defendant within the courthouse upheld because freedom 
of the press is "subject to reasonable rules seeking maintenance of the court's dignity and the 
orderly administration of justice"). 
Orders dosing courtrooms have been held to be subject to a balancing process which gives 
substantial weight to the right to public access under Pennsylvania's constitutional mandate of 
"speedy public trials" and "open courts." &ePA. CONST. art. I,§§ 9, I I (2001). See also In re 
Seegrist, 539 A.2d 799, 803 (Pa. 1988) ("Before dosing a judicial proceeding, a trial court must 
determine that closure will effectively protect the compelling interest endangered by openness 
and that the information sought to be withheld from public exposure will not be made public 
anyway."); Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 501 A.2d 226, 234 n.10 (Pa. 1985) ("Contakos does not 
stand for the implacable view that 'it is improper to exclude the public from a segment of a 
criminal trial."'); Commonwealth v. Contakos, 453 A.2d 578, 580 (Pa. 1982) (arguing that "the 
public shall not be excluded from trials ... [but] that the attendance at a criminal trial is sub-
ject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions"); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 414 A.2d 
318, 328 (Pa. 1980) (Larsen and F1aherty,lJ., concurring) (arguing that court proceedings 
should always be open to the public and the media, without exception). In Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, Inc. v.Jeromc, 287 A2d 425 (Pa. 1978), the court found that under Pennsylvania free expres-
sion provisions, 
any limitation on access should be carefully drawn ... [and] should not be limited for 
any reason less than the compelling state obligation to protect constitutional rights of 
criminal defendants ... and ... the threat posed to the protected interest is serious ... 
and access should be limited no more than is necessary to accomplish the end sought. 
!d. at 434. 
Likewise, records of public trials have been held to be subject to a mandate of public acces-
sibility under Article I, Section 7 and Article I, Section 11. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. French, 
611 A.2d 175, 180 n.12 (Pa. 1992) ("strongly condemning" sealing ofrecord and stating "public 
trials involve public records"). A separate common law rule, established under the "same con-
siderations," mandates access to material filed in courts. See PG Publ'g Co. v. Commonwealth, 
614 A.2d 1106 (Pa. 1992) (recognizing common law right of access to search warrants in the 
absence of good cause for sealing); Commonwealth v. Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d 414 (Pa. 1987) 
(holding that there is a common Jaw right of access to arrest warrant.~. absent substantial threats 
to legitimate state interests). 
135 See Commonwealth v. Armao, 286 A.2d 626, 632 (Pa. 1972). 
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recognition given by our state's constitution to a citizen's right to 
protect his or her reputation."136 
Outside of the context of reputation, however, a separate analysis 
under the Pennsylvania constitution is necessary. The fulcrum of 
analysis is the proposition under Article I, Section 7[b] that "every 
citizen may freely speak, write and grint on any subject, being respon-
sible for the abuse of that liberty. "1 ' 
Beginning with the constitution of 1790, eighteenth and nine-
teenth century courts held that the definition of "abuse" of free ex-
pression for which punishment could be imposed was tied to the 
common law: a common law criminal offense or tort was by definition 
an abuse of free expression. Thus, notwithstanding the constitutional 
protection of free communication, the early Pennsylvania courts had 
no difficulty in sanctioning criminal prosecutions for communicative 
actions which today would be recognized as obvious "abuses" such as 
riots, conspiracies and solicitations to engage in criminal acts, 136 and 
136 Sprague v. Walter, 543 A.2d 1078,108485 (Pa. 1988); see also Hatchard v. Westinghouse 
Broad. Co., 532 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1987) (interpreting Pennsylvania Shield Law to allow discovery of 
"out-takes" in libel actions to the extent that the documentary information does not reveal the 
identity of a personal source of information or may be redacted to eliminate the revelation of a 
personal source of information); Moyer v. Phillips, 341 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1975) (holding that ex-
ception in survival action for cause of action for libel and slander is arbitrary and thus violative 
of equal protection rights afforded under the state constitution for the protection of a funda-
mental right of reputation); Barrv. Moore, 87 Pa. 385,393 (1878): 
The high esteem in which reputation is held, and the protecting care which the organic 
law has thrown around it, are clearly expressed in first section of the Dedar.1tion of 
Rights .... The general liberty of the press must be construed in subordination to the 
right of any person calumniated thereby, to hold it responsible for an abuse of that lib-
erty. 
m As a textual matter, one might argue that the different phrasing in Article I, Section 20, 
protecting without qualification the right to assembly, petition and redress "in a peaceable 
manner" provides unqualified protection to political interchange and petition so long as it is 
peaceable. The Pennsylvania courts have, however, interpreted Article I, Section 20 and Article 
I, Section 7 in pari materia. &e Philadelphia Fraternal Order of Correctional Officers v. Rendell, 
736 A.2d 573, 576 (Pa. 1999); W. Pennsylvania Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut 
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1986); Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1981); 
Du~uesne City v. Fincke, 112 A. 130 (Pa. 1920). 
1 In the aftermath of the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court up-
held prosecutions for erecting "liberty poles" as standards of rebellion. Pennsylvania v. Morri-
son, I Add. 274 (Pa. 1795) (detailing prosecution for erecting a liberty pole "in defiance of the 
laws of the state of Pennsylvania"). See Respublica v. Montgomery, I Yeates 419, 422 (Pa. 1795) 
(discussing duty of magistrate was to prevent erection of liberty pole; "setting up [of] a pole at 
any time, in a tumultuous manner, with arms, is a riot" notwithstanding right of "free commu-
nication"). 
Ukewise, courts regularly upheld indictment.' for conspiracy and solicitation to illegal ac-
tions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 7 Serg. & Rawle 469, 474 (Pa. 1822) (regarding con· 
spiracy to sell illegal lottery tickets); see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Franklin, 4 U.S. 255 (1802) 
(upholding indictment under statute that defendants "unlawfully did combine and conspire, 
for the purpose of conveying, possessing, and settling, on certain lands within the limits of the 
county aforesaid, under a certain pretended title not derived from the authority of this com-
monwealth," on grounds that such conspiracies were violations of common law); Common-
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obstructions of the public highways. 139 But the courts equally ap-
proved common law prosecutions for seditious libel, 1-10 personal li-
b 1141 b . 142 bl h 143 bl' c: • '!44 d th e, o scemty, asp emy, pu 1c pro1ane sweanng, an e 
wealth v. Randolph, 23 A. 388 (Pa. 1892) (holding solicitation to commit murder is a common 
law crime although solicitation to commit fornication and adultery is not); In re Northern Lib-
erty Hose Co., 13 Pa. 193, 195 ( 1850) (upholding statutory proceedings to require fire company 
to close its doors because of rioting "by the [hose] company, or [its) adherents"). 
Pennsylvania's early conspiracy law extended to communications we would today regard as 
protected. E.g., Miffiin v. Commonwealth, 5 Watts & Serg. 461 (Pa. 1843) (upholding indict· 
ment for conspiring "to effect the escape of jane M. Nevin, an infant ... with a view to her mar· 
riage"); Commonwealth v. Eberle, 3 Serg. & Rawle 9 (Pa. 1817) (upholding conspiracy indict· 
ment for colorful language committing members of German Evangelical Lutheran 
Congregation to oppose the use of English in services); id. at 16 ("[T]he defendants complain 
of the hardship of charging them with all the rash and violent speeches of a few individuals. 
Such however is the law."}; Commonwealth v. Wood, 3 Binn. 414 (Pa. 1811) (discussing con-
spiracy prosecution against journeyman hatters). 
159 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected free speech claims and upheld a nuisance 
prosecution against a defendant who "by means of violent, loud, and indecent language" 
"caus[ed] to assemble and remain [in the public highway] for a long space of time great mem-
bers of men and boys, so that the streets were obstructed." Barker v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. 
412 (1852). 
The Court subsequently emphasized in Fairbanks v. Kerr & Smith, 70 Pa. 86, 92 (I 872}, that it 
does not follow that every one who speaks or preaches in the street, or who happens to collect a 
crowd therein by other means, is therefore guilty of the indictable offence of nuisance. His act 
may become a nuisance by his obstruction of the public highway, but it will not do to say it is a 
nuisance per se. Such a stringent interpretation of the case of Barker is scarcely suited to the 
genius of our people or to the character of their institutions. See also County of Allegheny v. 
Zimmerman, 95 Pa. 287 ( 1880) (holding plaintiff cannot claim that erection of a 40 foot liberty 
pole in public street prior to election was a nuisance per se); id. at 294: 
It is a custom sanctioned by a hundred years and interwoven with the traditions, memo-
ries and conceded rights of a free people . . . . It did not occupy the street to such an ex-
tent or in such a manner that any person complained of its interfering with the public 
travel. 
140 Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates 267 (1805) (detailing prosecution for statement that "[a] 
democracy is scarcely tolerable at any period of national history"). The Dennie court charged 
the jury that a conviction required a finding that the statement was "seditiously, maliciously and 
willfully aimed at the constitution" and that a privilege was available on a showing of "good mo-
tives, and for justifiable ends." The jury acquitted. 
111 Commonwealth v. Place, 26 A. 620, 621 (Pa. 1893) (criminal libel prosecution for news-
paper story that "sets forth in a sensational manner the details of a disgusting private scandal 
concerning parties residing in Pottsville"); Commonwealth v. Duane, I Binn. 601 (1809} 
(prosecution for libeling Governor held constitutional, but suspended by 1809 statute barring 
indictments for libel of public officials); see also Wood v. Boyle, 35 A. 853 (Pa. 1896} (upholding 
civil libel verdict in case brought after defendant had been acquitted on criminal libel charge}. 
14
• See Barker v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. 412, 413 (1852) (determining that prosecution for 
"openly and publicly speaking with a loud voice ... representing men and women in obscene 
and indecent positions and attitudes" is justified where statements are public and have a "ten-
dency ... to debauch and corrupt the public morals"); see also Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 
Serg. & Rawle 91, 102-03 (1815) (showing "painting, representing a man in obscene, impudent, 
and indecent posture with a woman,' despite the absence of public display was indictable at 
common law, like "an indecent book"); id. ("What tended to corrupt society, was held to be a 
breach of the peace and punishable."). The Pennsylvania Court continued to take the position 
that Sharpless was good law through the middle of the twentieth century. See William Goldman 
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offense of being a "common scold."145 So, too, the common law's bar 
against interference with contractual and business relations were held 
to sanction the issuance of injunctions against strikes, labor organiz-
ing and picketing as "abuses" of Pennsylvania's guarantees of free 
. . d bl 145 commumcauon an assem y. 
Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 173 A.2d 59, 64 (Pa. 1961); Commonwealth v. Blumenstein, 153 A.2d 
227, 228 (Pa. 1959). 
The Sharpless/ Barklff rule has been supplanted by more protective First Amendment rules. 
In evaluating the protection of sexualized communication during the last part of the twentieth 
century, the Pennsylvania Court has taken protection to be governed by federal standards. See 
Zimmerman v. Philjon, Inc. 368 A.2d 694 (Pa. 1977); Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 347 A.2d 
290 (Pa. 1975) (Pennsylvania obscenity statute unconstitutional under federal standards); 
Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 327 A.2d 118 {Pa. 1974) (holding contrary United States Supreme 
Court decision required reversal of Commonwealth v. Lalonde, 288 A.2d 782 (Pa. 1972), which 
had unanimously adopted a mandate that contemporary community standards in obscenity 
cases be established by expert testimony); Duggan v. Guild Theatre, Inc., 258 A.2d 858 (Pa. 
1969); Commonwealth v. Dell Publ'n, 233 A.2d 840 (Pa. 1967) (describing federal obscenity law 
as a conceptual "disaster area" but applying it); Commonwealth v. Robin, 218 A.2d 546 (Pa. 
1966). 
Justices Castille and Zappala have recently taken the position that an even more protective 
state rule shielded federally unprotected erotic dancing on the ground that "[!lawmakers may 
not categorically proscribe any form of protected expression simply because they are not at ease 
with its content." Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 284 (Pa. 1998) (Castille,J., concur-
ring in the result). rev'd on othlff grounds, 529 U.S. 277 (2000). 
143 Updegraph v. Commonweallth, II Serg. & Rawle 394 (1824) (holding that blasphemy 
may be punished, like cursing, swearing in public). 
144 Commonwealth v. Linn, 27 A. 843 (Pa. 1893) (prosecution dismissed because no suffi-
cient allegation that swearing was heard by the public); see also id. at 844 ("It cannot be doubted 
that profane swearing and cursing, in aloud and boisterous tone of voice, and in the presence 
and hearing of citizens of the commonwealth passing and repassing on the public streets ... is 
an indictable offense."). 
145 In james v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & Rawle 220, 225 (1825) the court declared unconstitu· 
tional, as cruel and unusual punishment "revolting to humanity," the punishment of subjecting 
women convicted of being common scolds to being "plunged three times in the water" on a 
"cucking stool." The court, however, despite some "hesitations" declared that "the offence of 
communis vexatrix' remained "punishable as a common nuisance, by fine, or by fine and impris-
onment." ld. at 236. See also Commonwealth v. Mohn, 52 Pa. 243 (1866) (upholding prosecu-
tion of "common scold" as a nuisance); id. at 246 ("As to the unreasonableness of holding 
women liable to punishment for a too free use of their tongue, it is enough to say that the 
common Jaw, which is the expressed wisdom of ages, adjudges that it is not unreasonable."). 
146 Kraemer Hosiery Co. v. American Fed'n of Full Fashioned Hosiery Workers, 157 A. 588 
(Pa. 1931) (enjoining union efforts to recruit employees who had signed contracts forbidding 
union membership);Jefferson & Indiana Coal Co. v. Marks, 134 A. 430, 432 (Pa. 1926) (injunc-
tion against parades and demonstrations "aimed at the fears rather than the judgment of those 
who desired to work"); Purvis v. Local 500 United Bhd. of Carpenters, 63 A.585 (Pa. 1906) (in-
junction issued against boycott, encouraging boycott, forbidding work on non-union material); 
Erdman v. Mitchell. 56 A. 327 (Pa. 1903) (injunction against "coercive" strike); Flaccus v. Smith, 
48 A. 894 (Pa. 1901) {injunction against "enticing" apprentices to break their indentures); 
O'Neill v. Behanna, 37 A. 843 (Pa. 1897) (injunction against strikers who used "annoyance, in-
timidation, [and] ridicule"). 
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Privileges were accorded in civil libel actions on the basis of "good 
motives" and "probable cause."147 This privilege and the broader con-
stitutional mandate extended their protection primarily to sober ad-
dresses to the public on political toJ.?ics, 148 though more extreme 
statements could prevail before juries.' 
In the early twentieth century, Pennsylvania courts began to 
evaluate limitations on free expression that diverged from the com-
mon law. In general, in the early years of the twentieth century, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was as deferential to legislative con-
straints as to common law limitations. Legislative exercises of the po-
lice power were held consistent with the guarantees of free e~res­
sion so long as the legislative determinations were "reasonable."1 
147 See Conroy v. Pittsburgh Times, 21 A. 154 (Pa. 1891) (claiming burden on libel defendant 
to come forward with evidence of probable cause where privilege is claimed); see also Neeb v. 
Hope, 2 A. 568 (Pa. 1886) (stating that in libel action for comments about actions of public of-
ficer, defendant can prevail either by showing probable cause for accusation or lack of "ill will" 
or "reckless disregard" of reputation); Chapman v. Calder, 14 Pa. 365 ( 1850) (holding that in 
slander action for privileged communication (here: charges to ecclesiastical tribunal) probable 
cause is a defense even if not given as part of claim of truth); Gray v. Pentland, 4 Serg. & Ralwe 
420 (1819) (holding that if charge is false, in order to prevail defendant must show he acted 
from mistake and with good faith); Gray v. Pentland, 2 Serg. & Rawle 23, 30 (1815) (defendant 
deposes before justice of the peace that prothonotary was drunk and unfit to perform duties; 
statement is actionable only if made "in malice" and "without probable cause"); M'Millan v. 
Birch, l Binn. 178, 186-87 (1806) (holding that "freedom of speech in what is called a COUTS/! of 
justice' presumptively privileges accusations before ecclesiastical tribunal; if accusations are 
made "in a decent manner" law will not "imply malice"); Runkle v. Meyer, 3 Yeates 518 (1803) 
(discussing case in which libel was upheld because defendant could not verify statements). 
116 See, e.g., Briggs v. Garrett, 2 A. 513 (Pa. 1886) (holding defendant is protected from libel 
judgment for reading letter attacking political candidate to good government group, where he 
acted with probable cause, despite the fact that the letter was inaccurate); see also Ex parte 
Steinman, 95 Pa. 220, 236, 239 (1880) (holding that attorneys are protected from disbarment 
for publishing statement that acquittal of defendant was "secured by a prostitution of the ma-
chinery of justice to serve the exigencies of the Republican party," where the attorneys were 
"acting in good faith, without malice, and for the public good"); In re Austin, 5 Rawle 191, 205 
( 1835) (holding critics of sitting judge protected ag-ainst disbarment; "liberty of the press" pnr 
tects "legitimate ... scrutiny ... where the public good is the aim"). 
149 E.g., Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates 267, 270 (1805) (jury acquitted printer indicted for 
seditious libel on the basis of the statement, "A democracy is scarcely tolerable at any period of 
national history .... "); cJ. Rowand v. DeCamp, 96 Pa. 493,502 (1880): 
No statute or rule was cited which obligates a citizen when discussing the conduct of 
public servants in their official capacity, who speaks the truth as he designs to be under-
stood and as he is understood by his hearers, to employ any prescribed form of expres-
sion or language. So long as he speaks the truth ... he is not liable in damages, whether 
his language be chaste or vulgar, refined or scurrilous. 
150 Commonwealth v. Widovich, 145 A. 295 (Pa. 1929) (upholding prosecution under sedi-
tion statute); id. at 299 ("The body that determines in the first instance what utterances of 
speech shall constitute abuse, is the legislature ... [w]hether the regulation of speech or print 
goes beyond the 'abuse of liberty' as contemplated by the Constitution, is for the courts. They 
may review the reasonableness of the enactments."); Commonwealth v. Foley, 141 A. 50 (Pa. 
1928) (upholding prosecution for circulation of anonymous defamatory pamphlet regarding 
district attorney under statute which prohibits anonymous "opprobrious" material, notwith-
standing constitutional requirement of "malice" or "negligence" in Article I, Section 7[c]; legis-
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Pennsylvania's courts began to develop a more assertive approach 
to the protection of the rights of free expression during the 1930s, in 
the shadow of the United States Supreme Court's application of fed-
eral free speech principles to the states. In Kirmse v. Adler, 151 the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court unanimously affirmed that the right of 
labor unions to peacefully urge employees to withdraw from em-
ployment or to induce customers of hostile employers to withdraw 
their patronage was "secured to the citizen [s]" by Pennsylvania's free 
expression protections. Characterizing the guarantees of free speech 
as "absolute rights," the court held that "[h]aving this unquestioned 
right to present their case to the public in newspapers or circulars in 
a peaceful way, if the employer suffers loss from this peaceable asser-
tion of rights, it is a damage without a remedy. "152 The constitutional 
guarantees were largely superseded in the labor area by statutory pro-
tection,153 and much subsequent litigation in the labor field turned on 
the construction of Pennsylvania's statutory protections in light of 
federal free speech jurisprudence. 154 Pennsylvania's courts, however, 
continued to recognize that "[p]eaceful picketing has been recog-
nized as a form of assembly and of speech, and has been afforded the 
protection of ... Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Pennsyl-
vania," and that "[a] state cannot because of its own notions of the 
lature determined that an anonymous publication "is of itself malice and negligence"); id. at 51 
("There is nothing in the Constitution to prohibit the legislature or the court from further de-
fining negligence or malice."); Buffalo Branch, Mutual Film Corp v. Breitinger, 95 A. 433 (Pa. 
1915) (upholding film censorship statute); id. at 435 ("[The police power] is more despotic and 
broader than the right of eminent domain . . . it is the application of the . . . principle of self 
preservation of the body politic."). See also In re Mack, 126 A.2d 679, 681 (Pa. 1956) {holding 
that freedom of the press is "subject to reasonable rules seeking maintenance of the court's 
dignity and the orderly administration of justice"). Cf Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 113 A. 70, 
72 {Pa. 1921) (stating that an a petition addressed to the legislature could "under no circum-
stances be penalized"). This approach left traces as late as mid-<:entury. Widovich v.'aS perhaps 
the high water mark of deference. Relying on the statement in Article XVI of the 1874 Consti-
tution that "the police power shall never be abridged," the Widovich court concluded, "[i]f the 
exercise of the police power should be in irreconcilable opposition to a constitutional provision 
or right, the police power would prevail." 145 A. at 298. This police power provision was de-
leted by the constitution of 1968. 
1 ~ 1 166 A. 566, 569 {Pa. 1933). 
152 !d. 
153 See, e.g., Labor Anti-Injunction Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 1198 {1937). 
154 See, e.g., Phillips v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 66 A.2d 227 (Pa. 1949) (stating that picket-
ing to coerce employer into requiring union membership (itself an unlawful act) can be en-
joined; using federal free speech analysis); Pennsylvania Labor Rei. Bd. v. Chester & Delaware 
County Bartenders, 64 A.2d 834 (Pa. 1949) (holding Pennsylvania statute outlawing picketing 
by non-employees unconstitutional under the First Amendment); Wilbank v. Chester & Dela-
ware County Bartenders, 60 A.2d 21 (Pa. 1948) (stating that picketing to induce employer to 
require union membership can be enjoined; requirement would itself be illegal); Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp. v. United Elec., Radio, & Mach. Workers Local601, 46 A.2d 16 (Pa. 1946) (uphold-
ing injunction against plant seizure by employees); Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. United 
Steelworkers, 45 A.2d 857 (Pa. 1946) (holding that employees could not block plant access). 
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wise limits of industrial dispute, either by legislative enactment or ju-
dicial determination, unduly limit the right of free speech."155 Out-
side the labor context the Pennsylvania Supreme Court continued to 
hold that efforts to persuade customers to withdraw their patronage 
were protected. 156 
The free speech analysis of Pennsylvania's high court in the mid-
twentieth century in large measure tracked federal doctrine. Thus, in 
the area of film censorship, the invalidation of vague and overbroad 
censorship schemes followed exclusively from federal precedents. 157 
So, too, in responding to the anti-communist fervor of the 1950s, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not interpret Pennsylvania's free 
expression provisions to provide greater protection than their federal 
counterparts.158 While Pennsylvania's hi~h court periodically decried 
the excesses of red-hunting repression, 15 where it provided relief, the 
155 American Brake Shoe Co. v. Dist. Lodge 9 lnt'l Ass'n of Machinists, 94 A.2d 884, 887-88 
(Pa. 1953) (citations omitted). See al>o Warren v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators, 118 A.2d 
168,171 (Pa. 1955): 
In a democracy, so long as the communication in a labor controversy-or in any other 
type of quarrel due to differences in view-advocates persuasion and not coercion, thus 
appealing to reason and not to force, there attends the message-bearer the invisible sen-
tinel of the law protecting the right of freedom of communication. 
156 Watch Tower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Dougherty, 11 A.2d 147, 148 (Pa. 1940) ("(Defen-
dants] cannot be mulcted in damages for protesting against the utterances of one who they be-
lieve attacks their church .... "); see also 1621, Inc. v. Wilson, 166 A.2d 271, 275 (Pa. 1960) (re-
fusing to issue injunction against picketing of taproom by neighborhood organizations, and 
holding that the right to "air grievances" is constitutionally protected). 
157 
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blumenstein, 153 A.2d 227 (Pa. 1959) (holding that a statute 
making the exhibition of indecent films punishable as a misdemeanor was too vague and un-
constitutional); Hallmark Prod., Inc. v. Carroll, 121 A.2d 584 (Pa. 1956) (stating that a statute 
allowing board to censor films was too broad). Subsequent obscenity analysis has also tracked 
the evolution offederal doctrine. See supra note 142. 
158 The trend began with Albert Appeal, 92 A.2d 663 (Pa. 1952) (upholding the discharge of a 
high school English teacher for "advocation of or participating in un-American or subversive 
doctrines"), and FitZ!JI1!'ald v. Philadelphia, 102 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1954) (upholding loyalty oath re-
quired of hospital nurse using an analysis based entirely on federal precedents). See also Bd. of 
Pub. Educ. v. August, 177 A.2d 809 (Pa. 1962) (upholding discharge of teacher for refusal to 
answer superior's questions about communist connections); Bd. of Pub. Educ. v. Soler, 176 
A.2d 653 (Pa. 1961) (holding refusal to answer questions about communist connections by su-
pelior grounds for discharge); Kaplan v. Philadelphia Sch. Dist., 130 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1957) (deny-
ing pay to teacher discharged for failing to reply to questions regarding communist affiliation); 
Bd. of Pub. Educ. v. Beilan, 125 A.2d 327 (Pa. 1956) (upholding discharge of teacher dis-
charged for failure to answer questions by school superintendent regarding communist affilia-
tions). 
100 See In reSchlesinger, 172 A.2d 835,837 (Pa. 1961): 
1t is a lamentable commentary, but none the less true, that, in the existing frame of the 
public mind, a lawyer who undertakes voluntarily the legal representation of a person 
charged with being, or even pointed at (in]'accuse fashion) as, a Communist runs the risk 
of a disruption of his law practice and the impairment of his own professional reputa-
tion. 
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court relied on requirements of due ~rocess and fair procedure 
rather than the rights of free expression. 1 
As the McCarthy era receded, the Pennsylvania's courts began to 
approach free expression cases with a somewhat greater degree of 
independence. 161 In recent decades, the Pennsylvania cases have 
See also Ault v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 157 A.2d 375, 378 (Pa. 1960) (noting ten-
dency of officials to "become myopic upon the mere mention of Communism"); Matson v. 
Margiotti, 88 A.2d 892, 899 (Pa. 1952): 
The recent practice of some high public officials to slander and vilify innocent people 
who have little or no chance to defend themselves or their reputation has shocked our 
nation and nearly every respectable citizen would like to see mud-slinging and unjustifi-
able character assassination by public officials and candidates for public office stopped 
or abolished. 
160 
See In re Schlesinger, 172 A.2d 835 (Pa. 1961) (reversing disbarment of former member of 
communist party because of multiple failures in process by which disbarment was imposed); Bd. 
of Pub. Educ. v. Intille, 163 A.2d 420 (Pa. 1960) (reversing dismissal of teacher for invocation of 
5th amendment before HUAC by relying on federal precedents); Ault, 157 A.2d 375 (Pa. 1960) 
(reversing denial of unemployment compensation to worker discharged for invoking Fifth 
Amendment before congressional investigating committee); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 85 A.2d 
425, 428 (Pa. 1951) {reversing conviction for assault in labor affray where prosecution "in-
jected" irrelevant testimony as to defendant's "communistic connections and activities"); Mat· 
son v.Jackson, 83 A.2d 134, 135-137 (Pa. 1951) (enjoining hearing by attorney general into "al-
leged communistic leanings, sympathies and utterances" of attorney on grounds that the 
attorney general lacked authority to conduct such hearings, "an authority that would be con-
trary to the spirit of all our laws which so jealously guard the right~ of the individual"); Schlesin-
ger v. Musmanno, 81 A.2d 316 (Pa. 1951) (reversing contempt citation and disbarment of at-
torney that trial judge concluded was a communist); Communist Party Petition, 75 A.2d 583 
(Pa. 1950) (issuing writ of prohibition against order mandating the padlocking of communist 
party offices as "without warrant in law"); Commonwealth ex rei. Roth v. Musmanno, 72 A.2d 263 
(Pa. 1950) (reversing order dismissing grand juror because trial judge concluded she was a 
communist). See also Commonwealth v. Nelson, 104 A.2d 133 (Pa. 1954), affd, 350 U.S. 497 
( 1956) (reversing sedition conviction because of federal preemption); cj Bd. of Pub. Educ. v. 
Watson, 163 A.2d 60 (Pa. 1960) (reversing dismissal of teacher for failing to answer HUAC on 
First Amendment ground; First Amendment privilege may not be well founded but refusal to 
answer Congressional committee is not statutory "incompetency"). 
161 See, e.g., William Goldman Theatres v. Dana, I 73 A.2d 59 (Pa. 1961) {holding that film 
censorship statute was unlawful prior restraint under Article 1, Section 7 despite recent U.S. Su-
preme Court case upholding film censorship under First Amendment); Locust Club v. Hotel & 
Club Employees' Union, 155 A.2d 27 (Pa. 1959) (holding that peaceful picketing of social club 
seeking to organize workers was protected by Article l, Section 7, even though federal prece-
dents might hold it unprotected under the First Amendment). 
Under the Pennsylvania constitution, the court began to review the actual probability of dis-
ruption invoked to justify limitations on expression. See, e.g, Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh Press 
Co., 396 A.2d 1187, 1189-1191 (Pa. 1979) (invalidating limit on advertising because of the ab-
sence of any showing that the limitation was "necessary to promote [employment discrimina-
tion] legitimate state interest;" the state's "unsubstantiated belief' that the prohibition would 
limit employment discrimination was insufficient); Conversion Center Charter Case, 130 A.2d 
107, Ill (Pa. 1957) (holding that a trial court may not deny approval of charter of "Conversion 
Center" aimed at converting Catholics; conclusion that group "might" create "unrest" is not 
sufficient reason because "an interdiction based on nothing more than the possibility of some 
future transgression of the law is a violation of the applicable constitutional guarantees"); 
American Brake Shoe Co. v. District Lodge 9 lnt'l Ass'n Machinists, 94 A.2d 884 (Pa. 1953) 
(holding that peaceful labor picketing of non-struck plant of multi-plant employer cannot be 
enjoined); see also id. ("A state cannot because of its own notions of the wise limits of industrial 
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regularly articulated a doctrine that allows the state to burden free 
expression only to the extent necessary to remedy demonstrated 
'l 162 I l Ad' B l C . . 1 a~ h eVl s. n nsurance fJUStment ureau v. nsurance ommtsswner, t e 
court announced that "Article I, Section 7, will not allow the ... re-
striction of commercial speech by any governmental agency where 
the legitimate, important interests of government may be accom-
plished practicably in another, less intrusive manner." Reviewing a 
prohibition on solicitation by claims adjusters within twenty-four 
hours of a loss, the court concluded that the legitimate governmental 
goal of preventing overreaching by insurance adjusters "could be ac-
complished by enforcement of civil, criminal and administrative 
remedies already in place." In regard to commercial speech, this 
"least restrictive alternative" requirement has been subsequently held 
to be limited to speech which is neither false nor misleading. 164 
This approach is congruent with the constitutional language that 
makes a citizen subject to "responsibility for abuse of liberty;" a re-
quirement that the burden on free communication be no greater 
than necessary to avoid a demonstrated harm follows the linkage of 
"responsibility" to a particular "abuse." There is no reason to believe 
this "least restrictive alternative analysis," which is sometimes more 
protective than First Amendment standards, is limited to commercial 
speech cases, since it seems clear that in terms of the concern for po-
litical and expressive liberty that underpin Pennsylvania's free expres-
sion j'urisprudence, commercial speech is far from the core of pro-
• 165 tected expression. 
dispute, either by legislative enactment or judicial determination, unduly limit the right of free 
speech."). 
162 
See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 387 A.2d 425, 435 (Pa. 1978) (stating 
that closure of trial is permissible where "the threat posed to the protected interest is serious" 
and the closure is "no more than is necessary to accomplish the end sought"); Pirillo v. Takiff, 
341 A.2d 896,901 (Pa. 1975) (upholding order preventing joint representation of 12 subpoe· 
naed witnesses by attorneys employed by police union because intrusion is "no greater than 
necessary to eliminate the substantive evil"); McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 308 A.2d 888 (Pa. 1973) 
(upholding refusal to allow access to names of welfare recipients because of interest in privacy); 
see also id. at 897 ("The statutory limitation imposed on appellees' asserted First Amendment 
right to compel the disclosure ... is no greater than necessary to protect the substantial gov-
ernmental and individual interests involved."). 
1
6.1 542 A.2d 1317, 1324 (Pa. 1988). 
101 Commonwealth v. State Bd. of Physical Therapy, 728 A.2d 340 (Pa. 1999) (holding that 
allowing chiropractors to advertise as "physical therapists" is misleading); see also id. at 343 
("[O)nly where speech is not misleading have we engaged in an analysis of whether, for pur-
poses of the Pennsylv-ania Constitution, there were available less restrictive means by which the 
government could have accomplished its objective."). 
lf>5 The analysis of the court in Boett~ v. Loverro, 587 A.2d 712, 718 (Pa. 199 I), construing 
Pennsylvania's wiretap statute not to impose liability for publication of intercepted communica-
tions obtained from court records after a motion to suppress had been denied, proceeded 
largely in terms of First Amendment values. However, the court's conclusion that "it cannot be 
said that the information ... [was] protected by a state interest of the highest order" because 
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CONCLUSION 
Two and a quarter centuries ago, Pennsylvania led the nation in 
establishing explicit constitutional guarantees of liberty of expression. 
In the intervening years, federal constitutional protections have also 
come to shelter the "free communication of thoughts and opinions." 
Yet during this same time Pennsylvania's courts have elaborated their 
own written guarantees into a fabric which both provides independ-
ent protection, and illuminates the underpinnings of free expression 
in a democratic society. It is well for both citizens and governors to 
acknowledge and respect that fabric; by setting it forth in some detail, 
it is my hope that this article renders that respect more likely and 
more practicable. By highlighting the independent resources with 
which the courts of Pennsylvania may work, perhaps the guarantees 
of 1776 will provide raw materials with which to continue to weave 
the protections for liberty in the twenty-first century. 
"our citizens' right to privacy does not extend to protecting a 'right to privacy' in illegal en-
deavors" is consistent with the notion that infringement on freedom of the press is acceptable 
no further than is truly necessary to protect important state interests. 
